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Summary 
Standards are important in the modern economy, as they promote innovation 
and facilitate interoperability and compatibility, thus benefiting consumers. 
Standard-setting can however have detrimental effects as well where a 
Standard Essential Patent (SEP) owner tries to extract unreasonable terms 
after implementers are locked in to the standard, known as the hold-up 
problem. Standard Setting Organizations (SSOs) commonly require 
members to license on Fair Reasonable and Non-Discriminatory (FRAND) 
terms to address this problem, but have for a number of reasons been 
ineffective. This thesis aims at establishing whether competition law has a 
role in enforcing FRAND in relation to two issues, that of excessive 
royalties and the seeking of an injunction. As well as what consequences a 
limitation of IPRs’ might have.  
   EU competition law directly condemns the charging of exploitative 
excessive royalties under Art. 102 TFEU. However, the practical difficulties 
in carrying out such an assessment, especially in technology markets, has 
contributed to that no formal decision has condemned such conduct. The US 
is reluctant to intervene due to the potential negative effects on the 
incentives to innovate and participate in the standard-setting process this 
uncertain assessment has. The US only intervenes against hold-ups as a 
result of an exclusionary conduct. However, case-law indicates that it is also 
difficult to prove, meaning that the EU under such regulation would have 
very limited possibilities to act. Therefore, despite the difficulties of the 
assessment and the consequential uncertainty, this thesis argues that the 
possibility to condemn these types of abuses fulfils an important role in EU 
competition law to address conducts where no other means are possible.  
   Seeking an injunction coupled with a demand of unreasonable terms is a 
concern in both the EU and the US. The US is in the forefront since the EU 
has not (yet) condemned such conduct. The US has limited the possibility 
for a SEP owner to seek an injunction to only be available against an 
‘unwilling’ licensee. The meaning of ‘willing’/‘unwilling’ licensee is 
accordingly interlinked to the definition of a ‘fair and reasonable’ royalty. 
This decision has met some resistance as it might deprive the value to 
participate in the process. 
   The question is whether there is a way to make the assessment of an 
excessive royalty less uncertain or whether there is any other, more 
appropriate, remedy by which SSOs can avoid these ex post problems with. 
In the last chapter it is concluded that no one-size fits all approach exists, 
that different solutions could potentially function in appropriate 
circumstances, but that they all risk having negative effects on the market. 
Consequently, they are no better than the FRAND regime. In the authors 
opinion the best method to prevent these problems and identify an excessive 
royalty is the current FRAND regime, if supported by appropriate 
benchmarks. The recent US Microsoft case demonstrates the possibility to 
carry out such an assessment in practice and might provide guidance for 
future cases, also in the EU.  
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Sammanfattning 
Standards är viktiga i dagens ekonomi då de främjar innovation och skapar 
interoperabilitet samt kompatibilitet, till fördel för konsumenter. 
Fastställandet av standarder kan dock även ha negativa effekter när 
innehavare av ett oumbärligt patent kräver orimliga villkor efter licenstagare 
blivit bundna till tekniken, det så kallade ”hold-up” problemet. 
Organisationer som fastställer standarder kräver vanligtvis att medlemmar 
åtar sig att licensiera sina ”oumbärliga patent” på FRAND (rättvisa, rimliga 
och icke-diskriminerande) villkor för att undvika detta problem. Denna 
uppsats ämnar utreda om konkurrensrätten kan verkställa FRAND och 
diskutera konsekvenserna av att begränsa patenthavares immateriella 
rättigheter. Två specifika problem utreds; när orimligt höga royalties krävs 
och när domstolsförelägganden begärs för att tvinga fram orimliga villkor. 
   Enligt artikel 102 FEUF är det i EU konkurrensbegränsande att kräva 
orimligt höga royalties. Bedömningen är dock svår att utföra i praktiken, 
speciellt inom teknologiska marknader, vilket har resulterat i att 
Kommission ännu inte har tagit något formellt beslut mot sådant missbruk. I 
USA betraktas detta inte som konkurrensbegränsande, då de anser att den 
ovisshet som bedömningen ger upphov till påverkar incitamenten till 
innovation och att medverka i standardiseringen negativt. I USA regleras 
endast ”hold-ups” om det är resultatet av ett utestängande beteende. Dock 
indikerar rättsfall att det kan vara väldigt svårt att påvisa en sådan effekt, 
vilket innebär att EU skulle ha begränsade möjligheter att agera under en 
sådan regim. Därför vidhålls det, trots svårigheterna i bedömning och 
ovissheten därav, att det nuvarande sättet att vidta åtgärder har en viktig roll 
i EU:s konkurrensrätt när det inte finns andra medel att tillgå. 
   En begäran om ett föreläggande anses vara ett problem i både EU och i 
USA. USA är dock längre fram i utvecklingen inom detta rättsområde, där 
EU (ännu) inte har tagit ett formellt beslut mot ett sådant missbruk. I USA 
har möjligheten för patenthavaren att begära ett föreläggande blivit 
begränsat så att det endast är möjligt när licenstagaren anses vara ”ovillig” 
att acceptera FRAND villkor. Innebörden av en ”villig”/”ovillig” 
licenstagare är således förknippat med definitionen av en rättvis och rimlig 
royalty. Konsekvenserna av ovissheten i en sådan bedömning gör att 
beslutet dock är ifrågasatt. 
   I det sista kapitlet utreds om bedömningen av royalties kan göras mindre 
oviss eller om det finns lämpligare lösningar för organisationer att undvika 
problemen med. Slutsatsen dras att det inte finns en lösning, utan att olika 
lösningar kan passa under lämpliga omständigheter. Dock är risken att även 
dessa har en negativ effekt på marknaden och utgör således inte 
nödvändigtvis ett bättre alternativ än FRAND. Enligt författarens mening är 
den för närvarande bästa metoden FRAND, avhängigt att FRAND baseras 
på lämpliga riktlinjer. Det aktuella rättsfallet Microsoft från USA påvisar 
möjligheten att genomföra en sådan bedömning i praktiken och kan 
eventuellt vara vägledande i framtida fall, även inom EU. 
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1 Introduction  
1.1 Background 
When a standard-setting organization (SSO) is assigned to create a standard 
that is practical, of benefit to its members, users or consumers, they are 
often given the unpleasant task of having to balance competing interests. A 
balance has to be reached between those who operate on the ‘relevant 
market’ but do not own standard essential patents (SEP) on the one hand 
with those who operate on the market but do own standard essential patents 
on the other as well as between members of the SSO. The question as to 
how this is done has been, over the past 10 years, a matter of intense debate 
on a practical as well as an academic level.  
 
There are two common approaches taken by SSO’s to these potentially 
dominant companies. The first is to obtain an agreement to licence on a 
royalty free basis and the second is to require members to license on 
FRAND terms.1 Royalty free licensing have for a number of reasons not 
proven to be a popular approach amongst companies due to the high cost of 
research and development. This makes it difficult, if not near impossible to 
persuade a company to give up its otherwise enforceable intellectual 
property rights on a royalty free basis. As a result the more common 
approach by SSO’s, and the one favoured by the European Commission and 
the Federal Trade Commission, is the use of FRAND or RAND in the US.2 
This means that the SSO seeks to obtain a commitment from the SEP owner 
to use it on fair, reasonable and non-discriminatory (FRAND) terms. In 
particular, FRAND commitments can prevent SEP owners from making the 
implementation of a standard difficult by refusing to license or by requiring 
unfair or unreasonable royalty fees after the industry has been locked in to 
the standard.3 However, few SSOs have provided a definition of FRAND, 
this leaves the companies oblivious about what they are actually committing 
to. It has accordingly been left to the firm itself and finally the Courts to 
decide this matter.4 Furthermore, where investments to implement a 
standard have already been made the possibility to exclude the SEP owner 
and hence enforce the FRAND commitment is limited.5 Does this mean that 
SSOs can more effectively enforce their FRAND policies through 
                                                
1 Cary, George S., Nelson, Mark W., Kaiser, Steven J., Sistla, Alex R., The Case for 
Antitrust Law to Police the Patent Holdup Problem In Standard Setting (2011) p. 916.  
2 There does not seem to be any substantial difference between these concepts more then 
linguistics.  
3 Guidelines on Horizontal co-operation Agreements (2011) para. 287.  
4 Simcoe, Timothy., Can standard setting organizations address patent hold-up? Comments 
for the Federal Trade Commission (2011) p. 8.  
5 Chappatte, Philippe., FRAND commitments-The case for antitrust intervention, (2009), p 
328.  
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competition rules? In the EU, as well as in the US, authorities encourage 
disclosure on FRAND terms in a standard setting process because of their 
pro-competitive effects. However, where a FRAND commitment is reneged 
upon, the SEP holder might run the risk of being caught under Art. 102 
TFEU, and section 2 of the Sherman Act or section 5 of the Federal Trade 
Commission Act in the US.  
 
In this thesis, two competition issues related to the enforcement of FRAND 
in case of a hold-up situation will be discussed; that of excessive royalties 
(where the SEP holder do not live up to its ex ante FRAND commitment by 
subsequently charging excessive royalties) and seeking injunctions (to 
prevent the use of the SEP until a settlement on the terms and conditions of 
the license has been reached). It is this element of the standard setting 
process that this study seeks to engage with, by evaluating whether the use 
of a SEP can be viewed as an anti-competitive action and at what point such 
conduct would be deemed anti-competitive. Furthermore, some scholars 
question whether competition authorities should intervene at all since the 
use of competition law to prohibit the strict exercising of a property right 
runs counter to the IPR (Intellectual Property Rights) of the SEP owner. 
Consequently, the effects of intervention will also be discussed and whether 
the enforcement of FRAND through competition law will negatively affect 
the incentives to innovate or the desire to participate in the standard setting 
process. These investigations will inevitably be followed by the continuous 
discussions on whether there are any other, more appropriate, solutions by 
which SSOs could address the hold-up problem with. Or whether there are 
any specific benchmarks that could bring more substance to the current 
FRAND regime. The importance of standardization for society as well as 
the effect it might have for innovation is indicative of it being an essential 
area of law, one that nonetheless is in need of some clarifications.   
1.2 Purpose 
Against this background, the purpose of this thesis is to identify the meaning 
of a FRAND commitment in relation to excessive royalties and injunctions 
as hold-up problems in the EU, and whether it can and should be remedied 
by competition law.  
 
The investigation will thus investigate whether competition law can be used 
to limit the freedom to set royalties, and if so what limitations FRAND have 
imposed on royalty setting of SEP owners in the EU and the US. The 
investigation will also aim at establishing whether competition law can limit 
the well-recognized patent remedy to seek injunctions by a SEP owner 
against a licensee. Such an investigation will require an analysis of the 
purport given to FRAND and how it has been enforced over the past years 
in relation to these types of abuses, in the EU and the US. However, 
intervention against these types of abuses can have negative consequences 
for e.g. the incentives to innovation or the desire of patent holders to 
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participate in the standard. Therefore, is it desirable to enforce FRAND by 
using competition law?  
 
The last chapter therefore seeks to address different solutions proposed by 
scholars to either improve the current FRAND regime or introduce 
alternative SSO IPR policies that would more effectively prevent the hold-
up problem. Are there any appropriate benchmarks that can be used to 
identify a FRAND royalty and cure the uncertainties of the assessment 
carried out by competition authorities? Furthermore, are there any realistic 
pro-active alternatives to prevent the involvement of competition law 
altogether. One suggestion is the possibility for SSOs to prevent the ex post 
problems by e.g. requiring detailed royalty determinations ex ante. The 
question is whether these are more successful in preserving the benefits of 
the incentives to innovate, participate and preserve the benefits of the 
process? Do such IPR policies risk competition law intervention against 
anti-competitive agreements?  
1.3 Method and Material 
When proceeding to investigate the purpose, a traditional legal dogmatic 
method will be used to establish de lege lata in the EU. The method will be 
used to describe and analyse EU competition law and policy. By 
considering interpretations from relevant legislation, Commission decisions 
and case law this method aims to establish the approach taken toward 
excessive royalties and injunction in the EU (and the US) and how 
competition law has been used to limit the licensing freedom of SEPs. This 
method will also provide the reader with an understanding of the clash 
between IPR and competition law and the concerns raised in relation to this.  
 
To broaden the discussions, a brief outlook toward the US will be given in 
order to highlight the different approaches taken as well as to highlight the 
EU and the US ideological differences. This comparative method is 
intended to give perspective to the issues under discussion, as the two 
systems somewhat diverge from each other. Main focus in the thesis will be 
given to the EU, the comparative method will therefore be aimed at 
providing the reader with an alternative perspective on the different 
reasoning taken toward the same issues, which subsequently might provide 
guidance on how the EU should proceed in the future.  
 
The nature of the topic will also require a law and economics perspective 
when evaluating what effects an intervention of competition law might have 
upon investments on the industry and innovation.  Competition law and IPR 
have been established to aim toward the same objective, to promote 
innovation and enhance consumer welfare. Does the current system 
effectively achieve these objectives or would a different approach be more 
appropriate? 
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To answer the question and following the method at hand the relevant 
material will be legislation, case law, legal doctrine and Commission notices 
as well as articles from both the EU and US. Material will be selected from 
prominent journals and mainly written from 2007 and onward to get the 
most updated discussions. There is not a large selection of case law and 
Commission decisions to choose between, however those that will be 
discussed in this thesis constitute guiding principles in their respective areas.  
1.4 Delimitations 
This thesis has its basis in Art. 102 TFEU and will accordingly not address 
the issues of the standard-setting process in relation to Art. 101 TFEU more 
than necessary. For instance in the futuristic chapter the different proposals’ 
potential anti-competitive concerns under Art. 101 TFEU will merely be 
highlighted. A prerequisite for the application of Art. 102 TFEU is the 
existence of a dominant position. There is however no presumption that a 
SEP owner is in a possession or exercise of market power, such an 
assessment is made on a case-by-case basis.6 For the purpose of this thesis 
the concept of dominance will not be elaborated upon and will therefore be 
assumed in the discussions. 
 
There are different types of standard, such as de facto standard, where a 
standard has evolved as a result of a widespread adoption by purchasers. 
However, this thesis seeks to engage with de jure standards created through 
joint discussions within an SSO. One of the major concerns with standard-
setting is the hold-up problem. The question of whether a hold-up situation 
is an existing problem or not has also been debated, however this is not 
something that this thesis seeks to elaborate upon.7 The most common way 
of preventing this type of problem is for SSOs to require FRAND 
commitments. Nonetheless, some SSOs require royalty free and zero royalty 
commitments. These concepts will however not be developed upon. 
 
Lastly, different solutions will be discussed to improve or change FRAND. 
This part does not seek to present an exhaustive list of solutions, it merely 
seeks to highlight some of the most discussed propositions, their benefits 
and drawbacks to conclude that there is no one-size-fits-all approach. 
1.5 Disposition 
Chapter II 
Contains a general introduction to the interrelationship between competition 
law and IPR, which is seen in standardization. The benefits of the standard-
                                                
6 Guidelines on Horizontal co-operation Agreements (2011) , para. 269.  
7 Geradin, Damien., Rato, Miguel., Can Standard-Setting Lead to Exploitative Abuse? A 
Dissonant View on Patent Hold-up, Royalty Stacking and the Meaning of FRAND (2007). 
They argue that the patent hold-up problem has been exaggerated.  
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setting process are also highlighted as well as its potential anticompetitive 
effects. SSOs commonly require FRAND commitments by their members to 
reduce these risks but are not clearly defined and not effectively enforced. 
Competition authorities have therefore been seen to intervene, the question 
is how to reach an appropriate balance between IPR and competition law, 
and between the members of the SSO when seeking to enforce FRAND. 
Chapter III 
In Part II, the limitation on SEP owners’ freedom to determine royalties 
will be investigated. It is of central importance to evaluate previous case law 
to identify potential alternative benchmarks and the difficulties of 
identifying these in dynamic industries. A US comparison will provide for a 
discussion on the appropriateness of regulation and differences in 
addressing hold-ups. 
Chapter IV 
Part III will involve a debate on whether such a well recognized IPR as the 
right to exclude could be limited by competition law and the consequences 
thereof. The US has provided guidance in the new Google case on when a 
SEP owner should and shouldn’t be allowed to seek injunction. Case law 
will be analysed to define the meaning of an ‘unwilling’ licensee, which will 
be interlinked with Part II of the thesis. The question is whether it is realistic 
that the EU will follow this approach. 
Chapter V 
This part seeks to present different proposals to better handle the 
uncertainties with the current regime. Firstly, proponents have suggested 
different solutions to strengthen FRAND, by introducing different possible 
benchmarks under which a FRAND royalty and a ‘willing’ licensee can be 
identified. Secondly, proponents have suggested alternative methods than 
FRAND to prevent hold-ups. These propositions are discussed in relation to 
each other with the intention of reaching a realistic de lege ferenda on how 
the EU could proceed. 
Chapter VI 
The final part of the thesis will contain concluding remarks on the topic in 
general. What is the meaning of fair and reasonable royalties in a standard 
setting process and when is a SEP owner allowed to seek injunctions to 
protect its IPR without the involvement of competition law?  Finally, is 
competition law an appropriate remedy to address the hold-up problem and 
if so, what is the way forward?  
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2 Competition law, IP and 
standard-setting 
2.1 The IP-Antitrust interface 
Intellectual property law regulates the creation, use and exploitation of 
mental or creative labour. The rationale behind protecting such rights has its 
basis in different philosophical considerations, found in moral and ethical 
arguments of creators natural or human rights over the products of their 
labour8. As well as ‘Law and Economics’ arguments, where the time and 
money invested in the development of the product should be rewarded, 
otherwise nothing would prevent others from free riding on this intellectual 
property. Furthermore, where a creator cannot enjoy the fruits of their work, 
what would be the incentives to invest in research and development? 
Therefore, where a creator is not adequately granted these rights it is likely 
to be undercut by competitors who have not suffered from the costs of 
creation. Such a situation where the market cannot protect the innovator and 
guarantee that it can recoup its investments is sometimes referred to as 
‘market failure’.9 It is accordingly these interests that IPR tries to protect 
and by doing so provide incentives to innovate.  
 
Competition law on the other hand seeks to regulate the market and its 
participants and through such regulation achieve its ultimate aim of 
promoting efficient markets, both in static and dynamic terms, to the benefit 
of ‘consumers welfare’.10 The enforcement of IPRs may be considered as 
anti-competitive since the very nature of IPR provides the proprietor with 
exclusivity on the market, which in competition law generally is referred to 
as market power or monopoly power. A position of market power provides 
the proprietor with the possibility to exclude others from the market, 
reducing competition and consequently reduce output and increase prices.11 
An undertaking that, due to its market power, could act to an appreciable 
extent independently of its competitors, customers and ultimately of its 
consumers is in a dominant position, within the meaning of Art. 102 
TFEU.12 By introducing these two areas of law it becomes apparent that 
there is a tension between them. 
 
                                                
8 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Art. 27(2), which also have its foundation in 
John Locke’s ’labour justification’; that individuals have a right to the fruits of their work.  
9 Bently, Lionel., Sherman, Brad., Intellectual Property Law (2009) pp. 4-5.  
10 The goal to promote consumer welfare was also stated by Commissioner Neelie Kroes in: 
SPEECH/05/512, 2005.  
11 Korah, Valentine., Intellectual Property Rights and the EC Competition rules(2006), p. 1.  
12 C-27/76, United Brands v. Commission, [1978] ECR 207, para 65.  
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The potential of competition law to limit a holders IPR has been 
demonstrated through the Magill13, IMS14 and Microsoft15 cases where the 
European Commission issued a compulsory licensing due to a refusal to 
license their rights. The challenge for competition authorities is how to 
strike a balance between preserving effective competition on the market and 
rewarding investments in innovation.  However, this balancing is not equal 
to competition law vs. IP law, on the contrary competition law also 
recognise the importance of providing incentives to innovate, which will 
benefit consumers in the long run. Therefore a balance within competition 
policy also needs to be achieved between, static and dynamic goals.16 An 
example of a static, short term, goal would be to pursue allocative and 
productive efficiency by promoting lower prices as well as increase output 
and a wider choice of products. While from a dynamic, long term, 
perspective allowing unfair high prices for a limited period of time could 
promote innovation and bring new or improved products to the market, 
eventually bringing prices down.17 This idea builds upon a theory by 
Schumpeter, who considered that the motivation to innovate is the prospect 
of monopoly profits, and even though innovators would be able to charge 
higher prices in the short run competitors would in the long run enter the 
market with superior technology to displace them.18 Kenneth Arrow presents 
an opposing theory where he believes that competition provides more 
incentives for innovation than the aspiration of monopoly power. The 
competitive pressure and that innovation will contribute to success in the 
market would thus provide more incentives. It is against this economic 
background that both the US FTC and the EU Commission has relied upon 
when trying to reach an adequate balance between the aims of IP law and 
Competition law.19  
 
The US, as the EU, recognize that in the absence of sufficient IPRs 
innovators would be deprived of an adequate compensation, which would 
deprive the incentives to invest and reduce the value of innovation.20 At the 
same time it is also acknowledged that certain conduct with respect to 
Intellectual Property may have anti-competitive effects which antitrust laws 
can and do protect against.21 Accordingly, a balance should be struck 
between the two. The US approach rests upon the belief in monopoly and 
                                                
13 C-241/91 P, Radio Telefis Eireann (RTE) and Independent Television Publications Ltd 
(ITP) v Commission of the European Communities, (1995) ECR I-00743.  
14 C-418/01, IMS Health GmbH & Co. OHG v NDC Health GmbH & Co. KG, (2004), ECR 
I-05039.  
15 T-201/04, Microsoft Corp. v Commission of the European Communities, (2007) ECR II-
03601.  
16 Scott-Morton, Fiona., Antitrust Enforcement in High-Technology Industries: Protecting 
Innovation and Competition (2012) p. 4.  
17 Anderman, Steven., Shmidt, Hedvig., EU Competition Law and Intellectual Property 
Rights- The Regulation of Innovation (2011) pp. 11-14. 
18 Whish, Richard., Bailey, David., Competition Law (2012) pp. 4-6. 
19 Anderman, Steven., Ezrachi, Ariel., Intellectual Property and Competition Law- New 
Frontiers (2011), p. 62.  
20 US Antitrust Guidelines for the Licensing of Intellectual Property (1995), section 1.  
21 US Antitrust Guidelines for the Licensing of Intellectual Property (1995), section 2.1. 
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competition; that property rights should enjoy strong protection and that a 
successful competitor should not be ‘punished’ when he wins. The US is 
therefore less sceptical towards monopoly power than the EU.22 It could 
therefore be argued that the US is fairly close to Schumpeter’s economic 
theory about monopoly. That does not however mean that IPRs are 
exempted from antitrust scrutiny, as argued in the ‘old’ Microsoft case23, it 
does not ‘act as a talisman that wards off all antitrust enforcement’.24 These 
differences will be further discussed below in relation to the specific issues 
under discussion.  
 
Against this background and irrespective of the tensions that exists between 
competition law and IPR, it has been established that they ‘indirectly serve 
the aims of the other’ by complementing each other in promoting innovation 
and competition dynamics to the benefit of consumers.25 Competition law 
could therefore be seen as a kind of safeguard in situations where the market 
does not produce an adequate level of innovation. However, competition 
rules should not be enforced in such a way as to unnecessarily reduce the 
incentives to innovate in its effort to protect efficient competition.26  
 
Standardization is one of the fields where the interaction between 
competition law and IPR becomes apparent and where competition 
authorities face challenges in reaching an appropriate balance. 
2.2 The standard-setting process  
‘Standards are good because they create the level playing field on which all 
can compete. More than that, good standard-setting helps consumers, 
boosts competitiveness and can spur market growth.’27 
 
Standards are extremely important in the current economic development and 
a key instrument in fostering innovation. The EU Commission has deemed 
the benefits that standards brought for the European industry as 
                                                
22 Käseberg, Thorsten., Intellectual Property, Antitrust and Cumulative Innovation in the 
EU and the US (2012) pp. 252-253.  
23 United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34 (D.C. Cir. 2001), Microsoft’s primary 
copyright argument borders upon the frivolous. The company claims an absolute and 
unfettered right to use its intellectual property as it wishes. . . . That is no more correct than 
the proposition that use of one’s personal property, such as a baseball bat, cannot give rise 
to tort liability.  
24 Pate, R. Hewitt., Competition and Intellectual Property In the US: Licensing Freedom 
and the Limits of Antitrust (2005), p. 2. 
25 Ghidini, Gustavo., Part I Chapter 2: The Bride and the Groom. On the Intersection 
between Intellectual Property and Antitrust Law (2012) , p. 29. And also US Antitrust 
Guidelines for the Licensing of Intellectual Property (1995), p. 2. 
26 Anderman, Steven., Shmidt, Hedvig., EU Competition Law and Intellectual Property 
Rights- The Regulation of Innovation (2011), p. 16.  
27 Speech by European Commissioner for Competition Policy Neelie Kroes, ’Setting the 
Standards high’, SPEECH/09/475.  
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tremendous.28 Standards are requirements or agreements between market 
participants that determine certain specific aspects around a good or service 
to reduce the diversity of different technical forms.29 Standards are generally 
considered to be pro-competitive. It promotes innovation, provides 
information as well as facilitates interoperability, compatibility and 
downstream competition. Furthermore, standardization generally increases 
competition and lower sales costs, thus benefiting consumers and economies 
as a whole.30  
 
Although standardization is a very important aspect in the market economy 
and is generally considered to be pro-competitive, the standard-setting 
process risk creating anti-competitive effects. Especially concerning the risk 
that a SEP owner would unduly exploit the enhanced market power it has 
acquired through the standard-setting process. Where a standard has been 
adopted it will inevitably reduce the number of technical substitutes on the 
relevant market, reducing inter-technology competition.31 Therefore the 
technology chosen to be included in the standard will consequently enjoy a 
significantly enhanced market power.32 Furthermore, where investments 
have been made to implement a standard the industry becomes locked-in to 
that standard since these investments would be lost if they would switch to 
an alternative technology.33 This could allow for a company to act anti-
competitive by e.g. holding-up users, either by refusing to license or by 
trying to extract excessive royalties, in other words prevent an effective 
access to the standard.  
 
Considering the diversity of interests between the members of an SSO it is 
not surprising that the terms and conditions of a license are disputed when 
the different members’ expectations are different. First we have the 
upstream-only companies, which solely develop and markets technologies 
relying on licensing revenue. Secondly, we have the downstream-only 
companies that solely manufacture products or offer services based on 
technologies developed by others, for whom royalties represent a cost. 
Lastly, we have the vertically integrated companies, which both develop 
technology and sell products, where royalties both constitute a revenue but 
also a cost, they might therefore seek to cross-licence.34 SSOs are therefore 
assigned to reach an adequate balance between the different interests 
between the licensor and the licensee, by securing an effective access as 
                                                
28 Communication from the Commission, A strategic vision for European Standards: 
Moving forward to enhance and accelerate the sustainable growth of the European 
Economy by 2020, COM(2011) 311 final, p.6. 
29 Weber, Rolf H., Competition Law versus FRAND Terms in IT Markets (2011), p. 51.  
30 Guidelines on Horizontal co-operation Agreements (2011), para. 263.  
31  Inter-technology competition (i.e. competition between undertakings using competing 
technologies). Intra-technology competition (i.e. competition between undertakings using 
the same technology) Guidelines on technology transfer agreements, (2004), para. 11.  
32 Chappatte, Philippe., FRAND Commitments- The Case for Antitrust Intervention (2009), 
pp. 325-326.  
33 Chappatte, Philippe., FRAND Commitments- The Case for Antitrust Intervention (2009), 
p. 325.  
34 Guidelines on Horizontal co-operation Agreements (2011), para. 267.  
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well as making sure that SEP owners will be adequately compensated. SSOs 
have therefore commonly adopted IPR policies that seek to preserve the pro-
competitive effects of the process by requiring members to disseminate their 
IP ex ante on fair, reasonable and non-discriminatory terms (FRAND).35  
2.2.1 FRAND 
By requiring a FRAND commitment, SSOs seeks to ensure that the SEP is 
available for implementation by members of the industry while making sure 
that the patent holders will be adequately compensated for their innovation. 
This commitment, when successfully applied, will minimize the anti-
competitive risks of patent hold-up as well as accelerate implementation of 
valuable technology and also secure compensation to the SEP owner on 
competitive terms and conditions.36 Even though FRAND licensing is 
commonly used by SSOs’ few policies actually define the meaning of it or 
give guidance on how to interpret it. This has rather been up to Courts or the 
right holder itself.37 Therefore, the FRAND regime offers no predictability 
and leaves licensors and licensees uncertain about the commitment. ETSI 
(the European Telecommunications Standard Institute) is one of the three 
major SSOs within the EU, which all require FRAND commitments from 
their members. In Section 4.1 of ETSI’s IPR policy it requires its members 
to ‘use its reasonable endeavours’, especially during the development of a 
standard, to inform ETSI of any SEP in a timely fashion. Under section 6.1 
a SEP owner shall be required to ‘give within three months an irrevocable 
undertaking in writing that it is prepared to grant irrevocable licences on 
fair, reasonable and non-discriminatory terms and conditions…’.38 
 
It is apparent that little guidance is provided by SSOs to its members since 
the IPR policies do not define FRAND as specifying or dictating a particular 
licensing result. In addition, the only course of action available for SSOs to 
enforce a FRAND commitment is to renegotiate the standard. This is 
however unlikely where no alternative technology exists or where heavy 
investments for the implementation already has been made.39 Therefore, the 
enforceability and the meaning of FRAND have been discussed extensively 
as to what limitations it places on SEP owners. FRAND can be divided into 
two components, the ‘fair and reasonable’ and the ‘non-discriminatory’ part.  
The non-discriminatory part is rather straightforward and perhaps most 
useful component in ensuring equal licensing terms for similarly situated 
licensees.40 However, concerning the meaning of the ‘fair and reasonable’ 
                                                
35 Weber, Rolf H., Competition Law versus FRAND Terms in IT Markets (2011), p. 54.  
36 Cary, George S., Nelson, Mark W., Kaiser, Steven J., Sistla, Alex R., The Case for 
Antitrust Law to Police the Patent Holdup Problem In Standard Setting (2011), p. 915. 
37 Weber, Rolf H., Competition Law versus FRAND Terms in IT Markets (2011), pp. 54-55.  
38 ETSI Rules of Procedure, Annex:6 ETSI Intellectual Property Rights Policy (2011).  
39 Chappatte, Philippe., FRAND Commitments- The Case for Antitrust Intervention (2009), 
p. 328. 
40 Policy Roundtable discussions at the OECD, Standard Setting, DAF/COMP(2010)33, p. 
45. 
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component scholars have to date not reached a consensus on the subject. On 
the contrary, many of the papers on the subject fundamentally contradict 
each other.41 The inadequacy of SSOs to give any meaning to FRAND 
commitments, both in substance and enforcement, has lead to the 
involvement of competition authorities to intervene where the non-FRAND 
licensing has been deemed anti-competitive.  
                                                
41 Layne-Farrar, Anne., Be My FRAND: Standard Setting and Fair, Reasonable and Non-
discriminatory Terms (2010), p. 2 And there cited articles. 
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3 Excessive royalties and the 
Hold-up problem 
One element of the licensing process that FRAND seeks to prevent is the ex 
post opportunism that permits a SEP owner to extract more favourable terms 
than what would otherwise have been possible.42 A hold-up situation often 
occurs when a SEP owner conceal or fail to disclose the patents which are 
essential or when it deceptively misrepresent that it will license on FRAND 
terms. After the standard has been adopted and implementers are locked in 
the SEP owner will demand excessive royalties.43 The failure of SEP 
owners to comply with their commitment to licence on FRAND terms, by 
holding-up users and demand excessive royalties, is a concern in the EU 
both in general and within the standard-setting context, under Art. 102 
TFEU.44 The concern with excessive royalties have been exposed to much 
scholarly writing regarding the question as to what level a royalty would be 
deemed excessive and consequently not in accordance with FRAND. Both 
licensors and licensees are placed in a position of legal uncertainty, which 
might negatively affect the incentives to innovate and participate, where 
market participants cannot assess the legality of their own practices.45 
 
The US, contrary to the EU, does not consider excessive prices to be an 
antitrust concern for a number of reasons addressed below. Therefore, to 
successfully challenge a hold-up situation under section 2 of the Sherman 
Act the conduct, be it a deceptive conduct or an excessive royalty, must be 
deemed exclusionary.46 Nevertheless, recent tendencies have suggested that 
                                                
42 Geradin, Damien., Abusive pricing in an IP Licensing Context- An EC Competition Law 
Analysis (2007), pp. 19-20. 
43 Hockett, Cristopher B., Lipscomb. Rosanna G., Best FRANDs Forever? Standard-Setting 
Antitrust Enforcement in the United States and the European Union (2009), p. 19. 
44 Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, Art. 102 TFEU.  
45 Glader, Marcus., Innovation Markets and Competition Analysis- EU competition law and 
US antitrust law (2004), p. 65. 
46 US. Code Title 15 Chapter 1 §2, ‘Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to 
monopolize, or combine or conspire with any other person or persons, to monopolize any 
part of the trade or commerce among the several States, or with  foreign nations, shall be 
deemed guilty of a felony, and, on conviction thereof, shall be punished by fine not 
exceeding $100,000,000 if a corporation, or, if any other person, $1,000,000, or by 
imprisonment not exceeding 10 years, or by both said punishments, in the discretion of the 
court’. 
"the possession of monopoly power will not be found unlawful unless it is accompanied by 
an element of anti-competitive conduct." Such conduct often is described as "exclusionary" 
or "predatory" conduct, Verizon Commons Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 
US. 398, 407. And US Department of Justice, Competition and Monopoly: Single-Firm 
conduct under section 2 of the Sherman Act, (05/11/2009), Ch. 1. 
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there might be a possibility to use section 5 of the Federal Trade 
Commission Act, to mitigate a hold-up situation absent exclusion. 47  
3.1 The concept of exessive pricing 
This chapter seeks to establish whether competition law can be used to limit 
the freedom to set royalties and compare with the US approach to provide 
the reader with a basic understanding of the issues inherent to such 
intervention.  
3.1.1 EU regulation of excessive pricing 
Royalty rates are generally not considered to be an antitrust concern. As 
stated in the 2004 Technology transfer guidelines, ‘parties to a license 
agreement are normally free to determine the royalty payable by the licensee 
and its mode of payment without being caught by Art. 101(1) TFEU’.48 
However, where a unilateral conduct by a dominant undertaking, whether in 
a standardization context or not, leads to exploitative or exclusionary prices 
it risks being caught under Art. 102 TFEU. Art. 102(a) TFEU states that an 
abuse is to ‘directly or indirectly imposing unfair purchase or selling price 
or other unfair trading conditions’. The article is in theory very 
straightforward, a dominant company setting prices significantly higher than 
those which would result from effective competition is an unfair price.49 
 
The rationale behind regulating exploitative excessive prices, prices that are 
simply too high, has its basis in three main reasons. Firstly, the text and 
history of Art. 102 TFEU are straightforward in its purpose to regulate this 
type of conduct. The second reason lies with the previously addressed goals 
of antitrust; to protect consumers from high prices enabling a wealth transfer 
from the consumer to the monopolist, by directly intervening against too 
high prices. Lastly, the reason for regulating exploitive excessive prices lies 
with the so-called ‘gap cases’. These cases exist due to the fact that Art. 102 
TFEU does not prohibit the acquisition of dominance, but only anti-
competitive conduct of firms already in a dominant position. The 
prohibition against exploitative excessive prices provides authorities with 
the possibility to address previously exclusionary conduct by linking it to 
                                                
47 US. Code Title 15 chapter 2 § 45.   
(1) Unfair methods of competition in or affecting commerce, and unfair or deceptive acts or 
practices in or affecting commerce, are hereby declared unlawful. 
(2) The Commission is hereby empowered and directed to prevent persons, partnerships, or 
corporations, [except certain specified financial and industrial sectors] from using unfair 
methods of competition in or affecting commerce and unfair or deceptive acts or practices 
in or affecting commerce.  
48 Guidelines on the application of Article 81 to technology transfer agreements (2004), 
para. 156.  
49 Whish, R., Bailey, David., Competition Law (2012), p. 721.  
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the present charging of excessive prices.50 ‘An excessive price case may 
then provide a possibility of “correcting” for a lacking intervention 
concerning exclusionary conduct ex post’.51 One example of such 
application is where an undertaking has acquired its dominant position by 
not disclosing its patent when it was involved in discussions on setting a 
standard.52  
 
From the foregoing the application of Art. 102 TFEU on excessive pricing 
might theoretically seem to be a straightforward task. However, in practice 
the Commission has rarely been seen to intervene and little guidance have 
been provided on when prices becomes excessive.53 The presently leading 
case is United Brands where the Commission considered that United Brands 
had abused its dominant position by charging different prices in different 
Member States, which where ‘excessive in relation to the economic value 
of the product supplied’.54 The CJEU stated that when a dominant 
undertaking use its position as a way to ‘reap trading benefits which it 
would not have reaped if there had been normal and sufficiently effective 
competition’ by ‘charging a price which is excessive because it has no 
reasonable relation to the economic value of the product supplied would 
be… an abuse’.55 The Court suggested a method by which it could be 
identified when a price is excessive comprised in a twofold test known as 
the cost-based approach.56 A more recent case, where the United Brands 
two-fold test was considered, is the Scandlines case where the Commission 
claimed that the port of Helsingborg imposed excessively high port 
charges.57 The Commission emphasised the difficulties that lies in applying 
the assessment in practice by stating that ‘even if it can be determined that 
the price-cost margin is excessive, it is difficult, if at all possible, to draw 
any conclusions on whether the prices are unfair when comparisons are 
made’.58 A number of cases have established methods of deciding the 
excessiveness of a price other than the test established in United Brands by 
solely relying on a benchmark to establish excessiveness.59 Alternative 
suggested benchmarks of comparison proposed have been; value 
                                                
50 Competition and Regulation, Excessive Prices- European Union, 
DAF/COMP/WP2/WD(2011)54, pp. 309-310. 
51 Competition and Regulation, Excessive Prices- European Union, 
DAF/COMP/WP2/WD(2011)54, p. 51.  
52 See: Rambus discussed in Section 3.2.1 below., Competition and Regulation, Excessive 
Prices- European Union, DAF/COMP/WP2/WD(2011)54, pp. 309-310. 
53 Coates, Kevin., Competition Law and Regulation of Technology Markets (2011), p. 83.  
54 C-27/76, United Brands v. Commission, [1978] ECR 207, para. 235.  
55 Ibid. para. 249-250. 
56 Ibid. para. 250-252.  
The Two-fold test:(1) it is shown that the price-cost margin (comparison between the 
selling price and cost of production of the product, which would disclose the amount of the 
profit margin) is excessive and (2) that it is shown that the price imposed is either unfair in 
itself or when compared to competing products. This did not exempt the possibility to use 
other solutions. 
57 Scandlines Sverige AB v. Port of Helsingborg, [2006] 4 CMLR 1224.  
58 Ibid. p. 207.  
59 C-110/88 Lucazeau v. SACEM, [1989] ECR 2811, [1991] 4 CMLR 248.  
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comparison60, price comparison61, geographic comparison62 and comparison 
over time63.64  
 
In relation to IPR the CJEU stated in the case Parke Davis that ‘a higher 
sale price for a patented product as compared with that of an unpatented 
product does not necessarily constitute an abuse’.65 This is the interpretation 
Advocate General Mischo in the Maxicar case makes by stating that ‘it 
appears to mean that the inventor is entitled to recover not only his 
production costs in the strict sense but also his research and development 
expenditure’.66 Furthermore in STIM the CJEU stated that the economic 
value of the service must be considered in relation to the copyright, to 
receive remuneration for the TV broadcasts of their works, and the interest 
of the television broadcasting companies, to be able to broadcast those 
works under reasonable conditions, and that an appropriate balance should 
be sought.67  
 
Against this background the test of excessive royalties seem to be difficult 
in practice and even more difficult in relation to IPRs in technology 
markets, because of the problem with identifying an appropriate benchmark. 
In light of these cases scholars have expressed concern regarding 
intervention against excessive royalties in a licensing relation of IP.68 The 
critique has largely been targeted towards the uncertainty of the test and the 
negative effects it might have on the incentives to innovate. Firstly, 
identifying the costs, under the first part of the United Brands test, in a 
technology market may be very difficult since the costs of bringing a 
product to the market cover not only the production costs. For example, the 
huge investment costs in R&D (Research and Development) should also be 
taken into account, as well as the possibility to recover the costs from failed 
                                                
60 ‘the price for a product should be reasonable in relation to the economic value of the 
product’.  
61 C- 26/75, General Motors Continental v. The Commission [1976] ECR 1367 and C-
52/07, Kanal 5 Ltd, TV 4 AB v. STIM, [2008] ECR I-9275, comparison with prices of 
competing products. 
62 C-110/88 Lucazeau v. SACEM, [1989] ECR 2811, [1991] 4 CMLR 248  and C- 395/87, 
Ministère Public v. Tournier, [1989] ECR 2521, comparison with price differences between 
Member States. The court concluded that a company in a dominant position charging 
appreciably higher royalties in one Member State compared to royalties charged in other 
Member States, and where those are being charged on a consistent basis, must be regarded 
as indicative of an abuse of a dominant position. Para. 25, 29. 
63 C-226/84, British Leland v. Commission [1986] ECR 3263, [1987] 1 CMLR 185, A 
dramatic increase of price over time can indicate an excessive price.  
64 Lidgard, Hans-Henrik., Part I Competition Classics, Material & cases on European 
Competition Law and Practice (2011), pp. 239-241.  
65 C-24/67, Parke, Davis and Co. v. Probel, Beintina-Interpharma and Centrafarm, [1968] 
ECR 55, para 72.  
66 Opinion of Mr. Advocate General Mischo in C-53/87, CICRA and another v. Renault 
(Maxicar), [1988] ECR page 06039, OJ C 284, para. 62.    
67 C-52/07, Kanal 5 Ltd, TV 4 AB v. STIM, [2008] ECR I-9275, para. 28-31.  
68 Geradin, Damien., Abusive pricing in an IP Licensing Context- An EC Competition Law 
Analysis (2007), p. 14. 
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R&D.69 This is why the possibility of charging prices above the unit cost of 
production is facilitated by IPR legislation, since it reflects the competitive 
rewards for an innovation.70 To identify what ‘costs’ should be included 
could be very problematic and may require expertise knowledge on the 
particular area. Secondly, it is difficult to identify an appropriate benchmark 
when it might be difficult to find something to benchmark with at all, 
considering the unique character of an IP. Thirdly, identifying a separate 
geographic market might also be problematic since a technology market 
often will be EU or worldwide. Furthermore, even if comparable patents 
would exist each negotiation is unique and might include other kinds of 
compensation such as cross-licensing. Therefore, an assessment would 
require an in depth analysis of the licensing contract, which is both resource 
demanding and might require expertise knowledge.71 
 
Against the foregoing, there is a widespread opinion that the EU 
Commission should no act as price regulators and intervene against the 
charging of excessive prices, especially in technology markets. 
Nevertheless, ‘to date, no decision of the Commission or judgement of the 
Community Courts has formally condemned a dominant firm for charging 
excessive royalties for a patent licence.’72 Perhaps it is because of the 
complicated nature of such an assessment. Therefore although the 
possibility to address and condemn excessive prices of IPRs exists it has 
been restrictively applied. 
3.1.2 US non-regulation of excessive pricing 
As already mentioned the US does not consider that simply charging too 
high prices, without more, to be an anti-competitive concern. These 
differences will be highlighted to provide the reader with an understanding 
of the complications underlying this area of law.  In the US an unregulated 
market is considered to be competitive as long as an artificial barrier has not 
been created. In other words, the US antitrust law is concerned with 
exclusionary conduct that a monopolist has exercised, either in order to 
maintain that position or in order to acquire one.73 The position taken by the 
US is supported by case law, where the Court has held that mere high prices 
resulting out of a monopoly power, without excluding competitors by 
improper means, is not in itself anti-competitive.74 As Hewitt puts it ’We 
                                                
69 Ibid. p. 14-15. 
70 Bishop, S., Walker, Mike., The Economics of EC Competition Law: Concepts 
Application and Measurement (2010), pp. 237-238. 
71 Geradin, Damien., Abusive pricing in an IP Licensing Context- An EC Competition Law 
Analysis (2007), p. 16-17. 
72 Ibid. p. 9.  
73 Gal, Michal S., Monopoly pricing as an antitrust offence in the US and the E.C: Two 
systems of belief about monopoly? (2004), p. 4. 
74 Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 603 F.2d 263, 297 (2d Cir. 1979). and US. v. 
Aluminium Co. Of America, 148 F.2d 416, 430 (2d Cir. 1945). 
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protect a competitive process, not a particular result, and particularly not a 
specific price’.75 
 
One strong argument against intervention of excessive prices is the belief in 
the self-correcting tendencies of the market. It rests upon the idea that high 
prices attract new firms to the market seeking to enjoy the high profits 
attainable, in accordance with the theory proposed by Schumpeter. The fear 
of such entry, or that there is new entry, will tend to make prices and profits 
falling. Excessive pricing action may disrupt this process by taking into 
consideration static (short term) benefits of bringing prices down instead of 
dynamic (long term) considerations that might impede new market entry, 
which could have otherwise taken place.76 Regulating excessive pricing 
might also impede the dominant firms incentives to invest in further 
innovation, hence charging high prices and profits should be seen as a 
reward for the firm’s efforts, innovations and investments.77  
 
Another argument against intervention is governments' efficacy in 
regulating prices. The difficulty in determining what is ‘excessive’ and 
‘reasonable’ could be nearly impossible where costs, demand and 
technological functions are constantly changing. That could create a high 
level of uncertainty, further undermining the investment incentives.78 The 
US Supreme Court has stated that competition laws are not sufficiently 
equipped to make an assessment of what is a reasonable or what is an 
excessive price.79 Furthermore an intervention would lead to a price 
regulation by the authorities, which would lead them in to a role of price 
regulation, which is undesirable.80 Therefore, a claim of exploitive excessive 
pricing will not have a successful outcome under US antitrust law, unless 
there has been an unlawful anti-competitive acquisition of a monopoly 
power.81 
3.1.3 Conclusions 
This part of the thesis demonstrates the possibility to intervene against the 
charging of excessive prices in the EU. Under such regulation it can be 
                                                
75 Pate, R. Hewitt., Competition and Intellectual Property In the US: Licensing Freedom 
and the Limits of Antitrust (2005), p. 8.  
76 The Pros and cons of High Prices (Swedish competition authority, 2007), p.18.  
77 Ibid. p.18-20. And Verizon Commons Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 
US. 398, 407 (2004): “The opportunity to charge monopoly prices at least for a short period 
is what attracts business acumen in the first case; it induces risk taking that produces 
innovation and economic growth”. 
78 Gal, Michal S., Monopoly pricing as an antitrust offence in the US. and the EC: Two 
systems of belief about monopoly? (2004), p.17. 
79 Pacific Bell Telephone Co. V. linkLine Communications, Inc., 555 US. 438 (2009), 129 
S. Ct. 1109 (2009), at. 1121.  
80 Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 603 F.2d 263, 297 (2d Cir. 1979). And The 
Pros and cons of High Prices (Swedish competition authority, 2007), pp.18-20. 
81 Geradin, Damien. Layne-Farrar, Anne., Petit, Nicolas., EU competition Law and 
Economics (2012), p. 4.436.   
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claimed that EU favour the static goals of competition.82 This chapter also 
emphasise the difficulties in assessing when a price becomes ‘excessive’. 
Firstly, from the case-law of the EU it is apparent that it is a challenging 
assessment to make due to the difficulty in identifying appropriate 
benchmarks, which is even more difficult in technology markets. Secondly, 
the stance taken by the US underlines how the application of such a 
prohibition might negatively affect the incentives to innovate and invest, 
due to the uncertainties of the assessment. Furthermore, competition 
authorities would be placed in a position as price regulator, which both the 
EU Commission and the FTC have established to be undesirable. It 
therefore does not come to any surprise that the Commission have rarely 
intervened. Nevertheless, in the present legal environment exploitative 
excessive pricing fulfils a role in EU competition law as a safe guard against 
anti-competitive conducts where no other means are available. It is therefore 
not possible to conclude that the intervention against these type of abuses is 
undesirable. However, because of the negative aspects such intervention 
might have it is important to emphasise that where the Commission can 
identify an appropriate benchmark and considers intervention, it is crucial 
that the costs of R&D needs to be taken into account, including the costs of 
failed R&D. The Commission is conclusively tasked with reaching an 
appropriate balance between the interests of the licensee and licensors as 
well as IP and competition law.  
3.2 EU - FRAND limitiation on royalties 
The different interests between members of an SSO have contributed to an 
increasing number of disputes concerning the meaning of a ‘fair and 
reasonable’ royalty. The starting point of determining whether a royalty is 
not ‘fair and reasonable’ and thus in violation of EU competition law is to 
evaluate it under Art. 102 TFEU, according to the test set out in United 
Brands. Standards are commonly set around IPR, which means that 
enforcers are faced with the already discussed issue of identifying an 
appropriate benchmark. If that was not enough, the very purpose of 
standardization is to exclude alternatives, which means that the possibility to 
find a comparison could be particularly complicated. As already mentioned, 
the difficulties inherent to the test in technology markets provide companies 
with a high level of uncertainty that risk harming the incentives to innovate 
and invest. Therefore, some have suggested that competition law is not the 
right instrument to address the hold-up problem.83 There are two relevant 
cases that have recently been scrutinized by the European Commission, the 
Rambus and Qualcomm cases.  
                                                
82 Gal, Michal S., Monopoly pricing as an antitrust offence in the US and the E.C: Two 
systems of belief about monopoly? (2004), pp. 2-4.  
83 Geradin, Damien., Reverse Hold-ups: The (Often Ignored) Risks Faced by Innovators in 
Standardized Areas (2010), p. 23. 
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3.2.1 Rambus  
Rambus was a member of JEDEC (Joint Electron Device Engineering 
Council), a US based world-wide SSO for computer memory chips, 
requiring their members to disclose their patent on FRAND terms.  In 2002 
two competing companies filed a complaint with the Commission against 
Rambus, which was the starting point of its investigation. The Commission 
issued a SO in 2007 where the Commission raised concerns about Rambus 
conduct, stating that it was aware of the benefits resulting from keeping its 
patent secret. Furthermore, without the so called ‘patent ambush’ Rambus 
would not have been able to charge the royalty rates they did. The 
Commission referred to its 1992 Communication ‘Intellectual Property 
Rights and Standardization’, which stated that ‘an IPR holder would act in 
bad faith if they were aware that its IP read on a standard in development 
and did not disclose its IPR until after the adoption of the standard. This 
would force its competitors to accept higher licensing fees than those which 
could have been negotiated at an earlier stage before the adoption of the 
standard.’84 The Commission thus claimed that Rambus had infringed Art. 
102 TFEU by intentionally breaching JEDEC’s patent policy, aimed at 
preventing the manipulation of the standard-setting process and ensuring 
that licences were offered to JEDEC members on reasonable terms. 
Furthermore, it stated that Rambus had, by undermining the standardization 
process, harmed technical development and the development of the market 
to the detriment of consumers.85  
 
In response to the Commissions SO Rambus settled with the Commission 
(although expressing disagreement with the findings) in 2009 to put a cap, a 
maximum royalty rate, for products subject to the JEDEC standard for five 
years. After the settlement the Commission stated that ‘there was no 
significant degree of Community interest for conducting a further 
investigation into the alleged infringement’. 86 
3.2.2 Qualcomm 
 In October 2007 The EU Commission decided to open formal anti-trust 
proceedings against Qualcomm Inc., a US chipset manufacturer, following 
complaints from a number of mobile phone and chipset manufacturers 
(among others Nokia and Broadcom). Qualcomm was an IPR holder in the 
mobile telephone standard sector, which formed part of the 3G standard for 
European mobile phone technology. Qualcomm possessed SEPs to the 
standard and had committed to licence these on FRAND terms.87   
 
                                                
84  Commission Communication "Intellectual Property Rights and standardisation", 
COM(1992) 445, paragraph 4.4.1. Also, referred to in the Rambus decision at point 32. 
85 Commission decision, Rambus (2009), Case COMP/38.636, para. 27-29.  
86 Ibid. para. 49-50.  
87 Commission initiates formal proceedings against Qualcomm, (2007), MEMO 07/389. 
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The claimants asserted that Qualcomm’s licensing terms and conditions did 
not comply with their FRAND commitment and accordingly breached EU 
competition rules. The complainants argued that a SEP owner should not be 
able to exploit its acquired market power resulting from the implementation 
to the standard. They furthermore claimed that non-FRAND royalties could 
lead to increased prices for consumers, as well as decrease present and 
future developments on the standard. The Commission accordingly 
investigated whether there was an alleged abuse of a dominant position in 
violation of Art. 82 [102] TFEU. According to the Commission, the 
assessment of whether Qualcomm had exerted exploitative terms on its 
competitors, contrary to Art. 102 TFEU, may depend on whether the 
licensing terms are in breach of its FRAND commitment.88  
 
The complainants withdrew their complaints (probably due to a behind the 
scenes settlement), which resulted in that the Commission closed all formal 
proceedings and left the case without any formal decision. The Commission 
stated that although the illegal behaviour by dominant companies, especially 
in innovative sectors, are important to address due to the detriment of 
consumers’ benefit of competition and choice, the assessment of the conduct 
in question ‘may be very complex, and any antitrust enforcer has to be 
careful about overturning commercial agreements’.89 
3.2.3 The 2011 Horizontal Guidelines 
The 2011 Horizontal Guidelines was adopted after the settlement was 
reached with Rambus and proceedings against Qualcomm were closed. To 
the disappointment of many, neither the Qualcomm nor the Rambus case 
gave any precedential value to the interpretation of FRAND. The 
Commission have however to some extent responded to the issues at stake 
in these cases in the newly adopted 2011 Horizontal Guidelines.  
 
The Guidelines states that in case of a dispute, the assessment of whether 
fees charged for access to the standard is unfair, and thus contrary to the 
SEP owners FRAND commitment, ‘should be based on whether the fees 
bear a reasonable relationship to the economic value of the IPR’.90  The 
FRAND commitment could therefore be claimed to be no more specific 
than the concept referred to by CJEU in United Brands.91 The Commission 
however recognise the difficulties inherent to the cost-based method 
suggested in United Brands, since it does not satisfactorily take into account 
the costs of the R&D of a particular patent. A few alternative benchmarks 
are therefore suggested by the Commission to render the assessment more 
effective; 
                                                
88 Ibid. 
89 Commission closes formal proceedings against Qualcomm (2009), MEMO/09/516.  
90 Guidelines on Horizontal Co-operation Agreements (2011), para. 289. Established in 
Case 27/76, United Brands, para. 250.  
91 Geradin, Damien., Abusive Pricing in an IP Licensing Context- An EC Competition Law 
Analysis, (2007),  p. 23.  
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- ex ante/Ex post benchmark, compare the licensing fees charged by the 
company in question before the standard was adopted in a competitive 
environment and before the standard has been locked in, with those 
charged after the standard has been adopted. Such an assessment must 
however be carried out in a consistent and reliable manner, as 
established in Tournier and SACEM.92  
- independent expert assessment, such an assessment would establish the 
objective centrality and essentiality of the standard to the relevant IPR 
portfolio.93 
- Ex ante disclosure of licensing terms, Such disclosures would make it 
possible to compared the ex ante disclosed terms with those required ex 
post.94   
- Comparable standards, where an appropriate comparable standard for 
an IPR can be established the royalty rates can be compared with each 
other.95 
- The Commission also leaves the possibility open for parties to settle 
this contractually in civil or commercial courts.96  
 
In conclusion, following the failure of the Commission to set some guiding 
principles in the Rambus and Qualcomm cases the Commission has 
somewhat clarified some guiding principles in relation to FRAND. They 
clarify that standards are generally pro-competitive and that standardization  
agreements, which ensure an effective access to the standard in a transparent 
process, normally would enjoy a sort of safe harbour position.97  
Furthermore, the importance of reaching an adequate balance between 
licensors and licensees are emphasised. Previous chapters discuss the 
difficulty in identifying an appropriate benchmark and accordingly reach 
such a balance. Accordingly, different possible benchmarks and other 
identified solutions have been discussed extensively. However, all of these 
raise different complications such as implementation problems or anti-
competitive concerns, as will be discussed in greater length below.98 
3.3 US-FRAND no limitation on royalties? 
The US, similar to the EU, recognise the importance standards have in the 
modern economy, but that collaboratively determined standards can reduce 
consumer choice and competition. Courts have therefore found liability 
where the standard-setting process has been manipulated or where the 
resulting standard has been used deceptively to gain a competitive 
                                                
92 Guidelines on Horizontal Co-operation Agreements (2011), para. 289.  
93 The problem is that two independent experts may disagree on the assessment of the same 
patent. Guidelines on Horizontal Co-operation Agreements (2011), para. 290.  
94 Ibid. para. 290.  
95 Ibid. para. 290.  
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advantage over rivals.99  Accordingly, the US also recognise the problem 
with hold-ups and the negative impact it might have on a competitive 
environment. However, considering the previously discussed difference in 
application between Art. 102 TFEU and section 2 of the Sherman act, the 
focus is not on establishing the excessiveness of a price. The focus is rather 
on whether a deceptive conduct, which has excluded competitors, has 
created an unlawful monopolization.100 Nevertheless, the FTC has, similar to 
the EU, taken a stance against hold-up situations in some cases, which 
(relevant or not) leads to excessive prices. Therefore the US approach to 
regulate this type of behaviour is interesting to address in relation to the EU. 
Two recent cases addressing these concerns are the Rambus and N-Data 
cases, where the latter was brought under section 2 of the Sherman Act and 
the former under section 5 of the FTC Act. 
3.3.1 Rambus 
The US Rambus case precedes the EU investigation of the very same 
company, nonetheless the investigation revolves around the same issue of an 
alleged ‘patent ambush’. As already mentioned in the previous chapter101, 
Rambus distorted the standard setting process by engaging in deceptive 
conduct, the ‘paten ambush’, that resulted in a hold-up situation of the 
patented technology as well as the subsequent charging of royalties of its 
own choice. The FTC accordingly found that it constituted a deceptive 
exclusionary conduct and unlawful monopolization of the market contrary 
to section 2 of the Sherman Act and section 5 of the FTC Act.102  The 
complaint was issued in June 18, 2002.  
 
Rambus appealed the FTC decision to the DC Circuit on the question of 
whether it had been engaged in deceptive conduct at all, and that ‘deceit 
merely enabling a monopolist to charge higher prices than it otherwise could 
have charged would not in itself constitute monopolization’ Rambus 
furthermore stated that the JEDEC policy was vague and that it therefore 
had not violated any clear duty to disclose patents.103 The FTC focused 
entirely on the allegation of monopolization under section 2 and claimed 
that absent Rambus deceptive conduct, JEDEC would have either excluded 
its technologies from the standard or required it to license its technology on 
[F]RAND terms with an opportunity for ex ante licensing negotiations.104  
 
                                                
99 US DOJ and FTC, Antitrust Enforcement and Intellectual Property Rights: Promoting 
Innovation and Competition (2007), p. 35. 
100 Abbott, Alden F., Kim, Nicholas J., Standard Setting and Hold-ups under section 5 of 
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101 See: Section 3.2.1.  
102 Opinion of the Commission, Public Record Version, In the Matter of Rambus Inc. 
Docket No. 9302, p. 3.   
103 Rambus Inc. v. FTC, 522 F.3d 456, ( D.C Circ. 2008), p. 2.  
104 Ibid. p. 4.  
 
27 
The Court disagreed with the FTC and considered that it had failed to 
demonstrate that Rambus’s conduct was exclusionary and thus harmed 
competition and that the FTC’s theories was not satisfactorily supported by 
evidence.105 Interestingly, the Court of Appeals considered the claim of 
deceptive conduct to be an insufficient antitrust claim since ’an otherwise 
lawful monopolist’s use of deception simply to obtain higher prices 
normally has no particular tendency to exclude rivals and thus to diminish 
competition’106 and that a mere loss of a commitment to license on FRAND 
terms does not harm competition by excluding alternative technologies.107 
On these grounds the DC Circuit found, contrary to the FTC opinion, that 
Rambus conduct was not an anti-competitive concern under section 2. The 
Court also commented on Commissioner Leibowitz concurring opinion 
suggesting a stand-alone action under section 5. It expressed serious 
concerns about the strength of the evidence relied on to support the 
Commissions findings, due to the unclear evidence of a duty to disclose 
under the SSO’s IPR policy and what Rambus had failed to disclose.108  
3.3.2 N-Data 
In late January 2008 the FTC issued a Consent Order where it settled with 
N-Data to limit the company’s ability to charge negotiated royalty rates for 
patents that had previously been integrated into an Ethernet standard for 
local area networks adopted by the SSO IEEE (The Institute of Electrical 
and Electronics Engineers).109 The previous owner to the patented 
technology, the inventor, was a member of the SSO and had committed to 
license its technology to any requesting party, on a non-discriminatory 
basis, and for a one time fee (1,000 USD).110 A few years later the patent 
was assigned to another company. It proposed a change of the previous 
commitment to the SSO and instead makes it available on a non-
discriminatory basis and on reasonable terms and conditions including its 
then current royalty rates, which it claimed would supersede previous 
commitment (seeking to disavow the 1,000 USD licensing term).111 
Subsequently, N-Data acquired the technology, whereby it threatened to 
initiate proceedings against companies that did not respect its new licensing 
terms and refused to pay the new royalty demands, which was far in excess 
to the original amount.  
 
The case was argued under section 5 of the FTC Act, regulating unfair 
methods of competition and unfair acts or practices, where the FTC claimed 
                                                
105 Ibid. pp. 8-9.  
106 Ibid. p. 6. And case NYNEX Corp. v. Discon, Inc., 525 US. 128, 119 S. Ct. 493, 142 L. 
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107 Ibid. p. 8.  
108 Ibid. p. 9.  
109 Analysis of proposed consent order to aid public comment, In the Matter of Negotiated 
Data Solutions LLC, File No. 051 0094, p.1.  
110 Ibid. p. 2.  
111 Ibid. p. 3. 
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that the two limiting principles were met.112 First, the requirement of 
‘coercive or oppressive conduct’ was satisfied due to creation of a hold-up 
situation (that it exploited its power against implementers lacking any 
practical alternatives). Second, the requirement that there’s an ‘adverse 
effect upon competition’, was met due to the charging of excessive royalties 
and the undermining effect such conduct poses to the standard setting 
process, to the detriment of consumers.113 The majority of the FTC 
considered that N-Data had violated section 5. Importantly, the FTC did 
however state that  ‘merely breaching a prior commitment is not enough to 
constitute an unfair act or practice under section 5’ but, that the standard-
setting commitment, lock-in effect as well as the widespread use of the 
standard, are important factors in this case.114  
 
Then-Chairman Majoras dissented from the majority’s opinion and stated 
that condemning a party for breaching its prior licensing commitment 
without finding a concurrent determination that the conduct violates the 
Sherman Act, would lead the Commission down a ‘slippery slope’. Mojaras 
furthermore stated that the Commission failed to identify any meaningful 
limiting principles of what constitutes an ‘unfair method of competition’.115 
Lastly Majoras expressed serious policy concerns about using a consumer 
protection authority to intervene in a commercial transaction to protect the 
alleged ‘victims’ [the computer manufacturers].116 
3.3.3 US Case analysis 
The Rambus case confirms the general approach to excessive pricing. Thus, 
where no evidence of an exclusionary conduct can be established, a lawful 
monopolist merely charging high prices is not sufficient to constitute 
liability under section 2 of the Sherman Act.117 However, these types of 
conducts are not easily proven and it requires clear and precise, not ‘murky’ 
IPR policies, as expressed by the Court in Rambus. The D.C Circuit took the 
opportunity to comment on a prior decision by the Third Circuit in 
Broadcom v. Qualcomm.118 The Qualcomm case was also brought under 
section 2 where liability was claimed due to its false promise to license on 
FRAND terms.119  The Court concluded that Broadcom’s claim was viable 
under section 2 since: ’(1) in a consensus-oriented private standard-setting 
environment, (2) a patent holder's intentionally false promise to license 
essential proprietary technology on FRAND terms, (3) coupled with an 
SDO's reliance on that promise when including the technology in a standard, 
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and (4) the patent holder's subsequent breach of that promise, is actionable 
anti-competitive conduct’.120 Contrary to the Rambus case the Court in 
Qualcomm found that strong evidence existed for the argument that without 
Qualcomm’s false commitment, the SSO would have chosen another 
technology. The DC Circuit did not find this decision helpful for the FTC in 
Rambus to establish that deceit lured the SSO away from a non-proprietary 
technology. The court stated that such a finding would conflict with 
‘controlling’ Supreme Court precedent and should not be regarded as anti-
competitive.121 It is apparent that there exists a tension between the Third 
and the DC Circuit regarding the application of section 2 to Hold-up cases. 
The main reason might be that the Courts’ interpretation of the relevant IPR 
policies lead to different conclusions concerning the existence of a clear and 
binding duty to disclose, which might have changed the SSO’s decision to 
include the relevant technology into the standard. It might therefore be 
difficult to provide sufficient evidence to prove causation between the 
alleged anti-competitive conduct and an exclusionary effect.  This 
demonstrates the importance of SSOs’ to require clear and binding IPR 
policies. Nevertheless, as highlighted by Hockett and Lipscomb, parties 
found liable by the FTC are likely to appeal to the DC Circuit rather than the 
Third Circuit, which might indicate that the FTC will not be able to benefit 
from the Qualcomm case.122 
 
Therefore, some have argued that section 5 is the most effective instrument 
to combat hold-ups. The N-Data case particularly illustrate the ability of 
section 5 to prevent the undermining of standard-setting processes beyond 
the traditional reach of the Sherman Act and the ability of SSOs’ to mitigate 
the problem themselves.123 Following the N-Data decision, a lot of critic 
was raised due to the ‘unlimited expansion’ of the application of section 5 of 
the FTC Act, especially in the dissenting opinion of then-Commissioner 
Majoras. The struggle between the different opinions regarding its 
application has primarily been around the fact that hold-ups are a concern 
between the market participants and not necessarily a harm to consumers. 
Nevertheless, the FTC and DOJ have stated that the costs of hold-up might 
be hidden because participants can simply pass on these costs to consumers. 
Therefore, absent antitrust involvement consumers can be the final 
victims.124 Chairman Leibowitz of the FTC responded to the failure of the 
FTC to address the hold-up problem in the Rambus case by stating that 
unilateral conduct cases are very difficult to win, even when the evidence is 
strong, which Rambus is a perfect example of. He believes that antitrust 
enforcement in the US have been enormously circumscribed during the last 
thirty years, some of which have gone too far. The purpose of antitrust law 
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is however to prevent anti-competitive conduct that harms consumers, and 
therefore section 5 of unfair method of competition provides a possibility to 
prevent this type of behaviour also outside the antitrust laws.125  
3.4 Conclusions 
This thesis set out a number of objectives, the first seeking to establish a 
comparative view on how FRAND have been enforced in relation to 
excessive royalties as a hold-up problem under competition law and what 
limits it has placed on a SEP owners freedom to determine royalties. 
Against the foregoing it is clear that the EU Commission have not enforced 
a single case concerning the interpretation of FRAND, although both 
Rambus and Qualcomm was under investigation. Disregarding the 
Commission’s failure to set any precedent on the subject they nevertheless 
demonstrate that it is prepared to take action against such conduct. The 
Commission could however be claimed to indirectly succeed in enforcing 
such a commitment by settling with Rambus to lower its royalty rates. It 
does however strengthen the theory that the EU approach of condemning 
exploitative excessive pricing, under the United Brands test, is too difficult 
to carry out in practice. Geradin is of the opinion that ‘in the absence of and 
exclusionary behaviour, EU competition law is not the right instrument to 
address hold up cases allegedly committed by essential patent holders’.126 
This would point in the direction of a similar application of competition 
rules as in the US.  
 
In the US, absent an exclusionary conduct, section 2 of the Sherman Act 
cannot be used to establish liability. Therefore ‘excessive pricing’ within the 
US standard-setting context, as in general, is not an antitrust concern, as was 
stated in the Rambus case.127. However, as illustrated in abovementioned 
cases hold-ups can be a concern under US antitrust law when it is created 
through an unlawful monopolization or deceptive conduct that will exclude 
competitors. The charging of excessive royalties is possible due to the 
creation of a hold-up situation, where implementers are locked-in to the 
standard and have no other choice than to pay the royalties. Therefore, by 
addressing hold-ups it can be argued that authorities indirectly address 
excessive royalties. The potential of section 2 to address hold-ups is 
demonstrated in the US Qualcomm case where it was established that a false 
promise to license on FRAND terms could also be regarded as a deceptive 
conduct, resulting in an unlawful monopolisation. However, considering the 
DC circuit’s statement in Rambus such a conclusion seem to presuppose that 
the SSO IPR policy is clear and binding; that absent a FRAND commitment 
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another technology would be chosen. Accordingly, causation must be 
established between the deceptive conduct and the unlawful 
monopolization, i.e. that the SSO would have implemented an alternative 
technology.128 As this thesis have already discussed, providing sufficient 
evidence of such causation and bring a successful claim under section 2 is 
not an easy task. As Chairman Leibowitz stated, unilateral conducts are 
difficult to address under section 2, even when the evidence is strong.129 
Against this background, the statement that EU should not intervene absent 
exclusionary conduct might instead leave EU unable to intervene at all. 
 
Interestingly, the N-Data case, although criticised, indicate on the contrary a 
converging trend between the EU and the US.130 Chairman Leibowitz, 
suggests that hold-ups should be addressed under the broader section 5 FTC 
Act, which could provide the possibility to address these problems also 
outside the antitrust laws. Following the N-Data decision it may be possible 
to claim a stand-alone action under section 5 against hold-ups, absent an 
exclusion of rival. However, it is not yet clear what the full extent of section 
5 in relation to hold-up is. Nevertheless, the reasoning presented by the FTC 
is interesting. It states that the creation of a hold-up situation where 
competitors are locked in to the standard and subsequently increase royalty 
demands could increase prices to the detriment of consumers, is very similar 
to the reasoning carried out in the EU when addressing ‘excessive 
royalties’.131 One should however be aware of that the N-Data case was 
specific since the inventor had set a specific royalty rate, which N-Data had 
largely excessed. It is possible that the US would not have so easily 
established liability under other circumstances, and probably not where the 
excessiveness needs to be calculated.  
 
In conclusion, the enforcement of FRAND is applied differently on the two 
sides of the Atlantic. Under US antitrust law FRAND does not impose any 
limitations on the freedom to set royalties and the true impact of section 5 
will remain to be seen. In the EU there has sill not been a formal decision 
where FRAND have been enforced against the charging of an excessive 
royalty, although the possibility exists. The key of such an assessment lies 
in identifying an appropriate benchmark, which is particularly difficult in 
technology markets. Authorities also needs to take into consideration the 
costs of R&D, which true amount is difficult to establish, otherwise 
innovation and participation would be a losing strategy. 132  It is clear that 
the assessment of the excessiveness of royalties is difficult to carry out in 
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practice, which leaves firms uncertain about what to expect as a result of 
their business decisions. As a result, firms might hesitate to participate in 
the standard setting process, which would deprive consumers of the benefits 
of the standard setting process. However, although it might be difficult to 
establish what a ‘fair and reasonable’ royalty is, the creation of a hold-up 
situation leading to excessive royalties undermines the standard-setting 
process and deprives consumers of its benefits. These types of conducts 
therefore need to be addressed in one way or the other.  
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4 Injunctive relief and the Hold-
up problem 
"The protection of intellectual property is a cornerstone of innovation and 
growth. But so is competition. I think that companies should spend their 
time innovating and competing on the merits of the products they offer – not 
misusing their intellectual property rights to hold up competitors to the 
detriment of innovation and consumer choice."133 
Concerns have not only been raised in relation to the charging of excessive 
royalties that creates a hold-up situation. In recent years there has been an 
increase of cases concerning injunctions sought where the terms and 
conditions of a license cannot be agreed upon. Such conduct has been used 
between mobile telephone manufacturers Apple, Microsoft, Samsung and 
Motorola against each other, the so-called smartphone war, over the 
meaning of FRAND.134  Similar to the concern with excessive royalties, 
such conduct could undermine the pro-competitive effects stemming from 
the standardization process.  
One of the basic rights of an IP owner is the right to prevent others from 
exploiting the fruits of their work. By seeking an injunctive relief a patent 
owner can prevent the accused infringer from continuing to exploit the IPR 
without a license to do so.135 The right to seek injunctions is an important 
factor in patent law both in the EU and the US, without which there no 
longer would be ‘as great an incentive to engage in the toils of scientific and 
technological research’136. Some scholars have however argued that within a 
standard-setting context injunctions could unduly affect the negotiation 
strength of the parties in a licensing situation, in favour of the licensor. 
Accordingly, the proprietor of a SEP could with the threat of an injunction 
increase its bargaining position in order to negotiate excessive royalties 
where implementers are locked into the standard, i.e. create a typical hold-
up situation. Some scholars have therefore argued that a proprietor who has 
made a FRAND commitment therefore should never be able to seek an 
injunctive relief.137 Enforcers are once again faced with the difficult task of 
balancing the interests at stake between licensor and licensee as well as 
between competition- and IP law.  
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4.1 FRAND limitation on injunctions in the 
EU 
The 2011 Horizontal Guidelines does not address the issue with injunctions 
in relation to FRAND specifically. Nevertheless, as previously discussed, 
where the pro-competitive benefits of the standard-setting process risk being 
distorted, by preventing an effective access to the standard and used to 
extract more favourable licensing terms, the Commission is likely to raise 
some concerns. Two recent cases concerning injunctions within the 
standard-setting context have been brought to the attention of the 
Commission, The Google/MMI merger decision and the Samsung Statement 
of Objection.  
4.1.1 The Google/MMI merger decision  
In late November 2011 the EU Commission was notified of a proposed 
concentration by which Google Inc. would acquire Motorola Mobility 
Holdings, Inc. Motorola was the proprietor of a number of SEPs to which it 
had committed to license on FRAND terms.138 Google promised in a legally 
binding and irrevocable letter to various SSOs to: (1) honour Motorola’s 
pre-existing FRAND commitments, (2) honour the maximum per-unit 
royalty rate of 2.25% of the net selling price for the relevant end-product, 
(3) continue to negotiate in good faith for a reasonable period unless either 
party initiate legal proceedings against the other or seek injunctive relief 
based on its SEP.139  
In its investigation the Commission firstly stated that, the very purpose of 
FRAND is to prevent SEP owners from making the implementation of a 
standard difficult by imposing excessive or discriminatory fees after the 
industry has been locked-in.140 Secondly, it stated that when a SEP owner 
seek an injunction against its ‘good faith’ counterpart in Court it could, 
depending on the circumstances141, significantly impede effective 
competition by forcing the counterpart to agree on terms and conditions that 
it would not otherwise have agreed to. It could also harm consumers by 
reducing output since products could be excluded from the market. 
Although the Commission expressed concern of such conduct it did not 
provide any specific guidance on the meaning of a ‘good faith’ licensee. 
Some third parties worried that Google would use its potentially acquired 
SEPs in such a way, but the Commission dismissed those concerns. It stated 
that Google had limited ability/incentive to seek injunctions due to its 
                                                
138 Commission decision, Google/ Motorola Mobility, Case No. COMP/M.638, para. 5-7. 
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FRAND commitment, especially against those who was already in 
possession of an existing license.142  
4.1.2 The Samsung statement of objections 
In January 2012 the Commission opened formal proceedings against 
Samsung to assess whether it had acted anti-competitive by seeking 
injunctions against users of their SEPs and reneged on its FRAND 
commitment to ETSI.143 In December Samsung dropped its lawsuit against 
Apple, probably with the hope of encouraging the Commission to stop their 
investigation.144 
Irrespective of Samsung’s action, the Commission, only a few days later 
sent a Statement of objections (SO) where it set out its preliminary view. 
The Commission states that although ‘injunctions are a possible remedy for 
patent infringement, such conduct could be abusive where SEPs are 
concerned and the potential licensee is willing to negotiate a licence on 
FRAND terms’. According to the Commissions preliminary view, the 
potential licensee (Apple) had shown to be willing to negotiate a FRAND 
license, accordingly the injunction could harm competition.145 
4.2 FRAND limitations on injunctions in 
the US 
The seeking of an injunction based on its SEP against a willing licensees 
and where a FRAND commitment has been made, have been challenged by 
the FTC as an unfair method of competition under section 5 of the FTC Act 
in two recent cases Bosch146 and Google/MMI. Google/MMI is the most 
recent, decided in the beginning of January this year (2013 and it provided 
some new guiding principles in this legal area of law.   
4.2.1 The Google/MMI consent order  
Before Google’s acquisition, Motorola had reneged on its commitment to 
licence its SEPs on FRAND terms by seeking injunctions against willing 
                                                
142 Commission decision, Google/ Motorola Mobility (2012), Case No. COMP/M.638, para. 
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144 BBC News, Samsung drops Apple sales case in Europe, 18 December 2012, Available 
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145 European Commission- Press Release, Commission sends Statement of Objections to 
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146 Analysis of agreement containing consent orders to aid public comment, In the matter of 
Robert Bosch GmbH, File No. 121-0081, Docket No. C-4377. 
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licensees. After the purchase of Motorola in June 2012 Google continued 
Motorola’s previous (anti-competitive) conduct. The FTC initiated 
proceedings claiming that such conduct might constitute an unfair method 
of competition, as well as unfair acts and practices, in violation of section 5 
of the FTC Act. The case never went to Court as Google settled with the 
FTC to withdraw its already sought injunctions against so called ‘willing 
licensees’ as well as assuring that no such future claims would be 
brought.147  
In the consent order the FTC recognize the pro-competitive effects of the 
standardization process and the role of FRAND to secure the efficacy of that 
process. Therefore, where FRAND is reneged upon it threatens to increase 
prices, reduce quality and hinder market entry. Consequently, the FTC 
established that breaching a FRAND commitment made to a SSO might 
injure competition.148 In comparison to previous precedents the FTC 
established a certain negotiation procedure that should be followed when 
claiming injunctions against FRAND-encumbered SEPs, set out in part III 
of the Consent Order.149 Furthermore, the FTC states under which narrowly-
defined circumstances it would be permitted for Google to seek an 
injunction: (1) the potential licensee is not subject to United States 
jurisdiction; (2) the potential licensee has stated in writing or in sworn 
testimony that it will not accept a licence for Google’s FRAND-encumbered 
SEPs on any terms; (3) the potential licensee refuses to enter a licence 
agreement for Google’s FRAND-encumbered SEPs on terms set for the 
parties by a Court or through binding arbitration; or (4) the potential 
licensee fails to assure Google that it is willing to accept a license on 
FRAND terms.150 Accordingly, Google may not seek an injunction simply 
because the potential licensee challenges the validity, value, infringement or 
essentiality of Google’s FRAND-encumbered patents.151 Google may 
however file for injunctive relief against a potential licensee that itself files 
a claim for injunction based on its FRAND encumbered SEPs. 
Commissioner Ohlhausen dissented from the majority as she considered this 
to be another undisciplined expansion of section 5. 152 Firstly Ohlhausen 
stated that she did not consider that seeking an injunction against a ‘willing’ 
licensee was sufficient to qualify as a stand-alone action of section 5. 
Secondly, she considered that the Noerr-Pennington doctrine153 preclude 
liability under section 5 for a legitimate pursuit of an injunction or any 
threats related to it, except under a handful exceptions not established here. 
Third, she disagrees with the majority’s finding that Apple should be 
                                                
147 Analysis of proposed Consent Order to aid public comment, In the matter Motorola 
Mobility LLC and Google Inc., File No. 121-0120, p. 1. 
148 Ibid. p. 4.  
149 Ibid. p. 7.  
150 Ibid. p. 6.  
151 Ibid. p. 7.  
152 Dissenting Statement of Commissioner Maureen K. Ohlhausen, In the matter of 
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regarded as a willing licensee, since Apple had stated in Federal Court that it 
would only ‘abide by the royalty rates it saw fit’.154  Lastly, she states that 
the Consent Order does not provide sufficient guidance on what the FRAND 
obligations actually entails and therefore leaves patent owners to guess in 
most circumstances whether they can safely seek an injunction on a SEP. 
She concludes by stating that this ‘sows additional seeds of confusion as to 
what can create liability’.155 
4.3 Conclusions 
The effects of an injunction is, against the foregoing, a concern under both 
EU and US competition law. The EU Commission as well as the FTC has 
stated that injunctions should not be an available remedy within the 
standard-context where a licensee is ‘willing’ to accept a license on FRAND 
terms. However, in the EU, the Commission has not provided any guidance 
on the meaning of a ‘willing’ licensee and many commentators are therefore 
eager to see whether Commission will take the opportunity to do so in the 
Samsung case. Furthermore, in May this year the Commission also sent a 
SO to Motorola on the same grounds as in Samsung, which shows that the 
Commission is prepared to take this type of conduct seriously.156 Even more 
interesting to follow will be the Preliminary Ruling Request to the CJEU 
from the Regional Court of Düsseldorf concerning the availability of 
remedies for SEP owners, including injunctions, who have committed to 
license on FRAND terms.157 Such a decision would not only give effect to 
the Commission investigation of Samsung and Motorola, it would give 
widespread effects on all Member States in the EU. It is very probable that 
the US will lead the way forward with its new Google/MMI decision.  
The FTC prohibited Google/MMI from seeking injunctions based on their 
SEPs, to which they had committed to license on FRAND terms, unless the 
licensee refused to participate in the special negotiation procedure set out in 
the order or under the four very limited defined circumstances. These does 
however seem to provide a SEP owner with a very limited possibility to 
seek an injunction.158 However, Microsoft, in its reaction to the Consent 
order, argues that the Consent Order does not sufficiently limit Google’s 
possibility to seek an injunction since it will be able to do so where it 
considers that an injunctive relief sought against it is based on a SEP. This is 
a problem since it is often difficult to determine which patents are essential 
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or not, meaning that firms would be ‘dissuaded’ from seeking to enforce 
their non-SEP.159 Whether this will be a future problem following this 
decision remains to be seen.  
Competition law can accordingly be used to enforce FRAND in relation to 
injunctions in both the EU and the US. The question is what consequences 
such intervention might have where SEP owners have a very limited 
possibility to seek to protect their own property. One aspect is that he 
alleged strong bargaining position of the patent holder would be shifted to 
the licensee, which would have little to loose in refusing to take a license. In 
the worst case scenario it would retroactively have to pay owed license rates 
(which it would have paid in any case) and at best the Court would lower 
the royalty rate. Therefore, a no-injunction rule would shift the bargaining 
position too heavily in favour of the licensee, which could cause a situation 
of reverse hold-up since the SEP owner could be insufficiently 
compensated.160  As already discussed, a reverse hold-up situation would 
consequently reduce the incentives to invest and innovate as well as to 
participate in the standard-setting process where they find no value in 
participating and decide that their patents are more valuable when not bound 
by a FRAND commitment. Therefore, the practical implications of the FTC 
decision in Google/MMI remains to be seen. What is clear is that the FTC 
has changed the negotiation dynamics, by somewhat adjusting the 
bargaining positions.  
The most imminent problem is however how to define what a ‘willing’ 
licensee is, which Ohlhausen argued that the FTC provided insufficient 
guidance of. Patent owners are therefore uncertain about what would cause 
liability and accordingly when an injunction safely could be sought. It is 
however possible from the foregoing to conclude that the concepts of 
‘willing’ and ‘unwilling’ is directly linked to the meaning of FRAND. We 
are accordingly back to the previous discussion on what a reasonable royalty 
is and to what extent a licensee must accept a SEP owners level of royalties 
before it becomes excessive, i.e. in conflict with FRAND. US authorities 
will be forced to calculate such a royalty in order to decide whether a 
licensee is ‘willing’ or not as well as to find an appropriate remedy where an 
injunction has been denied.161  
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5 Prospects for future 
developments 
Competition authority intervention relies on the meaning of FRAND and to 
what extent such a commitment can limit SEP owners IPR. However, as the 
previous chapters demonstrate this is not an easy task. The ‘right’ way to 
identify appropriate benchmarks in the EU has been subject to heated 
debates. This is perhaps not surprising considering that both over- and under 
compensation might harm consumers, by either raise prices or deprive the 
incentives to invest and innovate. Some proponents have therefore 
suggested different methods for the EU to improve its current practice by 
suggesting alternative benchmarks to identify a FRAND royalty. Others 
have suggested that competition law should only be seen as a second best 
alternative and that instead of relying on ex post enforcement, ex ante 
methods by strengthening the SSO IPR policies should be promoted. This 
chapter seek to present some of the most discussed solutions and analyse 
their benefits as well as their drawbacks. Furthermore, a recent decision 
adopted by a US District Court demonstrates the possibility to address 
excessive royalties under contract law, outside the boundaries of antitrust 
law, as well as identifies potential benchmarks.  
5.1 Ex ante/Ex post Benchmark 
This is perhaps the most common suggestion put forward by scholars 
seeking to prevent the ex post opportunism resulting from hold-up. They 
consider that the best model of calculating the reasonableness of royalties is 
to compare the rate offered ex post, after the standard is adopted, with the 
rate the SEP owner offered for the same patents ex ante. Such a model 
would ensure the reasonableness of a royalty since it would reflect the price 
the firm would be able to charge while it was competing to be included in 
the standard and before it has become more valuable through the 
standardization process.162 The model does however presume that the patent 
has been offered for license in a competitive environment ex ante. Such a 
benchmark could in some situations be identified without the involvement 
of SSOs, however, it largely relies on SSOs adopting clear and binding IPR 
policies regulating such disclosure.  
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5.1.1 Ex ante auction 
Swanson and Baumol have proposed a model of ex ante auction within the 
SSOs. The auction would be held between competitors before the standard 
was adopted and they would submit to license their technology for a certain 
fee. The SSO members would then chose which technology should win and 
be incorporated into the standard. According to their concept the outcome of 
the auction would provide a benchmark for what is fair and reasonable, the 
so-called efficient component pricing rule (ECPR), since it would reflect the 
price at a fully competitive environment.163 So far so good, but opponents 
have argued that such a model would be over simplistic since a standard 
generally is comprised of several firms and different types of patents. In 
such a case an auction system would become very complicated, raise costs 
of participation and slow down the process.164  
5.1.2 Ex ante joint negotiation 
Another suggestion to avoid the hold-up problem is for SSOs to organize 
joint ex ante royalty negotiations between the SEP owner and the 
implementer. The idea is that joint negotiation would create a collective 
buyer power that would counterbalance the SEP owner’s seller power.165 
This will provide SSO members with the possibility to choose a SEP with 
the most reasonable terms, leading to lower marginal costs and perhaps 
lower consumer prices.166 There are however some setbacks to this solution. 
Firstly, a negotiation process would require not only technical expertise but 
also lawyers and economists, which would result in additional costs being 
added to the process for the firms. Secondly, the negotiation method could 
also lengthen the standard-setting process where so many parties would be 
involved. The possible additional costs coupled with a lengthened process 
could in the end discourage firms from participating at all.167 Third, there is 
a risk that the negotiation model could force patent owners to settle for 
royalties which are set below their R&D costs, causing a so called ‘reverse 
hold-up’ situation where SEP owners would be undercompensated. This 
would deprive them of their incentives to invest and innovate.168 Lastly, to 
jointly discuss prices between competitors would for a competition law 
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attorney trigger a concern for anti-competitive conduct regarding cartel 
formation under Art. 101 TFEU. However, the Commission has in its 2011 
Horizontal Guidelines stated that such discussions that are reasonably 
necessary to avoid hold-up do not warrant a per se condemnation.169 The US 
competition authorities have also stated that such a model would not warrant 
a per se prohibition, but that the pro- and anti-competitive effects would be 
balanced under a rule of reason review.170  
5.1.3 Mandatory Ex ante disclosure 
Under this theory members would disclose their upper limit of 
compensation that they would expect for their SEP, and possibly their most 
restrictive terms as well.171 This solution does to some extent also risk 
causing anti-competitive concerns, by e.g. functioning as a price signal for 
coordination, although the anti-competitive risks are perhaps less apparent 
than with joint negotiations. Another concern is that SEP owners might be 
undercompensated, once again risk harming the incentives to innovate and 
invest. VITA (the VMEs International Trade Association) has adopted such 
an IPR policy requiring its members to ex ante declare a maximum royalty 
rate as well as their most restrictive non-royalty terms for all their patents 
that may become essential for the implementation. However, in an empirical 
report some of the interviewees argued that the adoption of a mandatory ex 
ante disclosure made the main players leave VITA.172 The policy to impose 
a sort of binding price cap has been reviewed by the US DOJ, which stated 
that it has no intention to challenge such disclosure, but reserved to bring 
action if proved in the future to be anti-competitive in purpose or effect.173 
The European Commission have also declared that they encourage the 
adoption of a patent policy which requires a duty to disclose e.g. maximum 
royalty rates ex ante.174  
 
In conclusion, ex ante benchmarks are generally positive, as the reasonable 
price would be set under a competitive environment. Furthermore, members 
of the SSO would take into consideration technical superiority, ease of 
implementation and price, meaning that a price set to high would probably 
not be chosen for implementation. The methodology for an assessment 
under an ex ante benchmark could be structured in the following way: ‘(1) 
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ex ante, a credible alternative to the adopted technology exists; (2) ex ante, 
prospective licensees cannot reasonably anticipate the licensor’s ex post 
requests; (3) ex post, the licensor requests worse licensing conditions than 
ex ante; and (4) ex post, the licensee is locked into the technology’.175 Ex 
ante benchmarks face a number of problems. Firstly, it is not certain that 
competing technologies exists at the time of implementation, which would 
deprive this solution from one of its starting points.176 Secondly, it might 
deprive inventors with the incentive to innovate where the value of the 
invention is unclear at the time of the adoption of the standard.177 For 
example determining the value ex ante would mean that the firm would not 
be able to adjust prices to market changes or the changes in the value of the 
standard over time. Lastly, it is also argued that such a price determination 
would give an IP-holder negative incentives to update or amend the 
product.178 
5.2 ART and numeric proportionality 
This idea has its basis in that a FRAND rate should correspond to the level 
of contribution the SEP has made to the standard in question. Under the 
method the calculation of a reasonable royalty should be based on the share 
of essential patents a firm has. So, where a standard is comprised of 100 
patents that are deemed essential and a firm own 10 of those SEPs, this firm 
would be entitled to 10% of the total royalty the standard commands.179 The 
‘total royalty the standard commands’ would be based on the ‘Aggregate 
Reasonable Terms’ that each SEP owner would determine on its own. These 
would add up to the cumulative royalty rate that the numeric proportionality 
would be applied to.180 However, the different interests involved in an SSO 
will make the determination of an appropriate ART difficult, implementers 
will seek to have as low ART as possible and SEP owners as high ART as 
possible. Chappatte is a proponent of this method and suggests that a patent 
owner could through this method compare its royalty with other patent 
owners’ and decided if it is proportionate. If it is not, objective justifications 
should be presented. This method, compared to the ex ante suggestion, 
would duly take into account negotiations between multiple patent owners 
and adjust to the dynamics of the market as the proportion of the aggregate 
maximum rate can vary over time in accordance with R&D carried out ex 
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post.181 However, instead of disputes concerning the definition of a 
reasonable rate disputes would arise about whether a patent is essential or 
not.182 Geradin presents some opposing arguments against the use of this 
method. Firstly, such a calculation would inevitably put a cumulative price 
cap on a technology that could mean that innovators might be 
undercompensated for their work. Secondly, this model presumes that all 
SEPs have an equal value, which is not always the case in practice, as 
patents provide different benefits and have different value to the industry 
and consumers.183 Therefore, this method is perhaps best suited in e.g. 
patent pools where participants regard their patents as roughly equivalent to 
other participants value.  
5.3 Contract law and US (F)RAND royalty  
Because of the inadequacy of competition law to define FRAND and 
provide appropriate tools to identify what constitutes a ‘fair and reasonable’ 
royalty another suggestion is to interpret FRAND as a contractual obligation 
between the SSO and the SEP owner. Contract law would accordingly 
govern a breach of a FRAND commitment.184 Such an action was recently 
brought under the US District Court concerning a dispute between Microsoft 
and Motorola, decided on 25 April 2013. The case is also interesting as it is 
the first judicial decision concerning the interpretation of RAND royalties 
and might be useful as guidance in EU competition law proceedings. 
5.3.1 Microsoft v. Motorola 
Microsoft claimed that Motorola had breached its RAND commitment to 
the relevant SSOs by seeking excessive royalties.  In a precedent it had been 
established that a standard user, as a third-party beneficiary, could enforce 
these contracts.185 In assessing whether the royalties was in accordance with 
RAND the Court adopted a modified version of the Georgia-Pacific 
factors186 to recreate a hypothetical negotiations between the parties. The 
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hypothetical negotiation recreated the ex ante licensing negotiation scenario 
and the agreement that would have prevailed at the time.187 The 
methodology would take into account the value of the SEP to the standard 
as well as the importance of the SEP and the standard to the final product.188 
Judge Robart states that a proper methodology to determine RAND royalty 
should seek to mitigate the risk of hold-ups and royalty stacking that RAND 
intends to avoid. While at the same time preserving the incentives to 
innovate and participate by guaranteeing a reasonable reward.189 The 
decision is very long, 207 pages, and provides a reader with a very detailed 
presentation and assessment of the factors taken into consideration. These 
will however only be presently briefly in the following.  
 
Judge Robart firstly assessed the relevance of the standard and whether it 
was reasonable in relation to the final price of the end product. He stated 
that if all SEP owners to the relevant standard would charge similar 
royalties as Motorola it would exceed the total product price of Microsoft’s 
end product (the X-box). In addition to these concerns of royalty-stacking 
the Court found that Motorola’s SEP portfolio only constituted a minimal 
contribution to the relevant standards.190 Another indicator, suggested by 
Microsoft, was to compare the royalty with what was charged in a patent 
pool, which was the ‘closest real-world comparable’ for the determination 
of RAND for Motorola’s SEPs.191 The Court did however consider that 
using a patent pool as a comparable would not duly take into consideration 
the importance of a patent to the standard, and that technologies important 
for the standard should be able to enjoy higher royalties. In a patent pool 
royalties are distributed equally regardless of the importance of the 
technology.192 This could result in that SEP owners would hesitate to 
participate in the standard-setting process.193 However, in some 
circumstances a patent pool can constitute at good comparable. Therefore, if 
it is to be used an assessment should take into consideration both the 
royalties received by the pool, but also other values for the company, such a 
rapid and broad adoption of the technology. The Court concluded that in this 
instance the patent pool royalty was an indicator of a RAND royalty rate as 
the characteristics of the pool closely aligned with all the purposes of 
RAND.194 Other considered suggestions to be used as indicators of a RAND 
royalty were ARM195 and InteCap Analysis196. These will however not be 
addressed further, due to their specifics to this particular case.  
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Against this background the Court concluded that the royalty rates charged 
by Motorola was not in accordance with its RAND commitment and 
established specific royalty rates per unit it should be able to charge, which 
was significantly lower than what Motorola had charged.197 
5.4 Conclusions 
The objective of this chapter was to provide the reader with a de lege 
ferenda perspective on how the EU best should proceed in the future. The 
level of uncertainty the assessment entail and the risk it poses to the 
incentives to innovate and participate as well as the fact that Competition 
authorities would take a role as price regulators leaves us with the same 
conclusion as this chapter started out with. Competition law should only be 
used in the extreme to mitigate the hold-up problem and should therefore be 
used as a second-hand alternative. Competition authorities should instead 
work pro-actively by requiring SSOs to adopt policies stipulating a 
transparent process, unrestricted access as well as clear and binding IPR 
policies.198 The above mentioned suggestions have for example been 
deemed by the EU and US Commissions’ to not warrant a per se 
condemnation as anti-competitive agreements. In light of the foregoing it is 
however clear that the different alternative IPR policies requiring ex ante 
disclosure have their benefits as well as their drawbacks. The adopted IPR 
policy, whether FRAND or any other IPR policy, needs to be agreed upon 
between members of the SSO, adopted according the market environment at 
hand and reflect the different interest between them in order to an as far 
extent as possible preserve the benefits of the standard setting process 
without depriving the incentives to innovate and participate. It is however 
clear that although some alternatives might prevail in different sectors they 
do not introduce a one-size-fits-all approach that will mitigate the hold up 
problem. Therefore, when considering the implementation problems as well 
as the risks they could pose to the incentives to innovate and participate 
many of the suggested IPR policies are no better than FRAND. Until a 
silver-bullet appears the best alternative to balance competing interests and 
preserve the incentives to innovate and participate is probably the FRAND 
regime. I therefore find myself torn, on one hand FRAND is uncertain and 
the assessment is undesirable as it is difficult to carry out in practice, risking 
a reverse-hold-up situation and market failure. On the other hand by not 
intervening the whole standard-setting process risks being undermined and 
depriving society of its benefits. However, the newly adopted Microsoft 
                                                                                                                        
196 Ibid. Para. 591-612. InteCap was a previous consulting firm for Motorola that performed 
valuation analysis.  
197 Ibid. Conclusion, p. 207.  
198 a safe harbour, where; (1)Participation in the standard-setting is unrestricted, (2)The 
procedure for implementing a standard is transparent, (3)There is no obligation to comply 
with the standard and (4) SSO IPR policies should ensure an effective access to the 
standard on FRAND terms, Guidelines on Horizontal Co-operation Agreements (2011), 
para. 280.  
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case brings some clarity to FRAND and might contribute in providing it 
with some substance. The case also demonstrate the possibility to identify a 
reasonable royalty by using different benchmarks and assess them in 
relation to each other.  
 
First, a hypothetical negotiation situation was established, under which it 
was considered what would have been negotiated between the parties ex 
ante. The Court tried to reason with what indicators the parties would 
reasonably have considered when assessing whether the negotiated royalty 
was reasonable, by using the Georgia-Pacific factors as guiding principles. 
Second, a proportionality assessment was considered, although not the 
same as the ART and Numeric proportionality the underlying concept is the 
same; that the value should be proportionate to its contribution to the 
standard and to the final product. The Court found that if all SEP owners to 
the final product would charge the same royalty rate the cumulative royalty 
rate would exceed the final price of the product. This rate could not be 
justified by the value of the SEP, since the Court found that it had minimal 
value to the final product. The third important indicator considered was to 
identify a comparable, as already discussed such a comparable can be very 
difficult to identify. However, where it can they provide a strong indicator 
to whether a royalty is excessive or not. In the Microsoft case a similar 
patent pool technology was used as a comparable (although it should be 
mentioned that specific circumstances should be at hand for such a 
comparison). Against this background one can conclude that benchmarks 
can be identified where specific market requirements are at hand and when 
identified they should be considered in their full commercial context (value 
of the patent, types of compensation etc.). This is as mentioned the first 
judicial decision (finally) setting a precedent on the subject, although 
brought under US contract law, and it is probably going to be extensively 
cited.  It is possible the EU will find support in this case to bring some 
substance to future competition proceedings concerning the meaning of ‘fair 
and reasonable’ terms by setting a precedent. The question is whether the 
Commission is equipped for this type of extensive economic assessments? 
Would these types of proceedings therefore have a future under EU contract 
law?  
 
Conclusively, where appropriate benchmarks can be identified I find myself 
supportive of the FRAND regime as the presently best alternative to address 
hold-up problems. However, to ensure to an as far extent as possible that the 
‘right’ price is identified, not one but a number of different benchmarks, as 
was done in Microsoft, should be used and compared with each other. 
Furthermore, it cannot be emphasised enough how important it is that the 
court identifies and takes into account the right ‘costs’. As the US courts 
have stated competition authorities are not equipped enough to make this 
type of in depth economic assessments that to some extent also require 
expertise knowledge. Whether these concerns will be best addressed under 
EU competition law or follow the US route under contract law remains to be 
seen. What is clear however is that the only way to cure these uncertainties 
is to set some precedents.  
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6 Concluding remarks 
The balancing between competition law and IP law as well as between static 
and dynamic goals is as already mentioned a delicate matter within a 
standard-setting context. The balancing has been applied differently on the 
two sides of the Atlantic, because of the underlying different objectives, 
beliefs and interests. Furthermore, the EU and US competition laws are 
structured differently, where the US have the possibility to condemn an 
unlawful acquisition of dominance, while the EU can only condemn an anti-
competitive conduct in the existence of dominance. These differences 
coupled with their different beliefs in property and monopoly power have, 
as this thesis have established, contributed to a difference in application 
particularly in regard to excessive pricing. As the reasoning behind US non-
intervention against excessive pricing demonstrates, the assessment of such 
conduct can have detrimental effects to the incentives to innovate and 
participate. This might undermine the whole standard-setting process and 
deprive consumers from enjoying the benefits resulting thereof. The EU has 
in Art. 102 TFEU the possibility to intervene against exploitative excessive 
pricing, under which regime the EU have been claimed to favour static goals 
instead of recognizing the importance of the dynamic, long term, 
perspectives However, no decision of the Commission or community Courts 
have officially condemned an excessive price within a technology market. 
Probably because of the much discussed difficulties with the test. 
The enforcement of FRAND in relation to exploitative excessive royalties 
has also been applied differently between the two. In the EU the 
Commission have not enforced a single case against a non-FRAND royalty, 
although both Rambus and Qualcomm was under investigation. Which 
strengthens the theory that the test is simply too difficult and uncertain to 
carry out in practice. However, adopting a similar approach as the US and 
only address exclusionary behaviours would not, considering the US case 
law, provide the EU with a more effective way to tackle the hold up-
problem. In the US, liability cannot be established under section 2 of the 
Sherman Act absent an exclusionary conduct. Therefore, excessive royalties 
is within the standard-setting context, as in general, not an antitrust concern. 
FRAND have however been enforced successfully against a hold-up 
situation (indirectly serving to reduce the royalty rates) in Qualcomm where 
causation between a deceptive conduct (a false promise to license on 
FRAND) and an exclusionary conduct (that the SSO would have chosen an 
alternative technology had it known Qualcomm’s intentions). Nevertheless, 
as the Rambus case demonstrates and as Chairman Leibowitz states, 
unilateral conducts are difficult to address even where the evidence is 
strong. There might also be a possibility to address hold-ups absent 
exclusion under section 5, as the N-Data case indicates. This case have 
however been criticised, therefore it remains to be seen whether section 5 
will be a viable alternative in the future. The US, does not help in bringing 
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any clarity to how the assessment of an excessive royalty should be carried 
out in practice. The US case does however confirm that for the EU to rely 
solely on exclusionary conducts could be just as troublesome to prove as an 
excessive price. However, this type of conducts needs to be addressed in 
one way or the other, which is also supported by the fact that the US have 
expanded section 5 to address hold-ups. It is therefore difficult to argue that 
the EU is not right to intervene against excessive royalties, where no other 
means are available. Nevertheless, this thesis maintains that competition law 
should only be used in the extreme, due to its potential detrimental effects, 
and should accordingly place more focus in securing transparent processes 
and clear and binding IPR policies within SSOs.  
The identification of a FRAND royalty is closely connected to defining a 
‘willing/unwilling’ licensee and the right of a SEP owner to seek an 
injunctive relief. The US is in the forefront in this area of law, but the EU is 
(probably) not far behind. Much indicates that the EU will find inspiration 
in the recent US Google/MMI consent order. The FTC established that SEP 
owners could not seek an injunction, unless the licensee refused to 
participate in the special negotiation procedure set out in the order or under 
the four very limited defined circumstances. These do however seem to 
provide a SEP owner with a very limited possibility to seek an injunction. 
The effects of such intervention are that the dynamics of a negotiation is 
changed and the bargaining position could be shifted too heavily in favour 
of the licensee, causing a situation of reverse hold-up since the SEP owner 
could be undercompensated. Furthermore, the uncertainties of what a 
FRAND royalty is leaves SEP owners uncertain of when they could safely 
seek an injunction. The risk is therefore that SEP owners might find that 
their property is more valuable when not included in a standard  
Against the foregoing there is a need to make the assessment of excessive 
royalties more effective and less uncertain or perhaps replace the current 
FRAND regime with other ex ante methods, who’s meaning would be less 
uncertain. It is concluded in this thesis, that it is desirable to introduce 
effective IPR policies that ex ante will prevent hold-ups or at least reduce 
the uncertainties of not knowing what will be considered as reasonable and 
that competition authorities should provide some sort of safe harbours for 
these types of policies. However, the proposed alternative IPR policies 
makes it clear that although some might prevail in different sectors they do 
not introduce a one-size-fits-all approach that will mitigate the hold up 
problem. Therefore, when considering the implementation problems as well 
as the negative effects on incentives to innovate and participate, many of the 
suggested IPR policies are no better than the current FRAND regime. The 
recent Microsoft decision demonstrate the potential of identifying a FRAND 
royalty by using indicators sought from a number of different sources and 
compare them, all to ensure that the balancing between IPR and competition 
law is satisfactorily made. Where a number of appropriate benchmarks can 
be identified and the right ‘costs’ are taken into account, FRAND seems to 
be the currently best alternative to cure the hold-up problem of excessive 
royalties. However, whether the Commission is the right instrument for 
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these assessments remains to be seen. Against this background, is the US 
Microsoft case brought under US contract law, an interesting aspect for the 
future. It demonstrates the possibility to identify different benchmarks and 
how to value them. Furthermore, it might also suggest that contract law  
might provide a better alternative for future FRAND disputes also within the 
EU. It will be interesting to follow these developments 
In conclusion, Competition law can and have been used to limit the IPRs of 
a SEP owner. What this thesis boils down to is what a ‘fair and reasonable 
royalty’ is? These types of disputes will continue to play an important role 
within both EU and US standard-setting and the only way to cure these 
uncertainties is to (continue) to bring precedents.  
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